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This thesis explores the impacts of fiscal decentralization on woreda level spending and local
health and education outcomes in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Using fiscal decentralization
theory, we predict that local conditions will affect future local spending patterns because
local governments possess superior information and respond to heterogeneous preferences. In
similar fashion, we also predict that local spending patterns will impact future outcomes.
Government collected household survey data and local government expenditure data are used
to investigate this theory. While results indicate that some woreda conditions have an effect on
future local spending behavior, the effect of local spending on future outcomes is ambiguous.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Political History
of Ethiopia
1.1 Introduction
If federalism refers to “. . . both centralized and decentralized levels of decision-making in which
. . . the provision of public services [is] determined largely by the demands for these services. . . ”
(Oates, 1972, p. 17), then fiscal decentralization refers to the process of devolving fiscal re-
sponsibility to lower levels of government in accordance with these local needs and preferences
(as we will see, however, constituent preferences are not always the preferences used in decision
making). These responsibilities include raising revenue—in the form of central government
transfers or local taxes—for, and spending on, public goods. Public goods with benefits that
are local in scope—such as local roads, primary healthcare, and sanitation—should be pro-
vided by local governments if they are not prohibitively costly. Nationally beneficial public
goods, such as national defense and major roads, should be provided by central governments.
And while local governments are best suited to allocate certain public goods, most agree the
1
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central government should oversee redistribution efforts and macroeconomic stability programs
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Smoke, 2001).
For the past 30 years, fiscal decentralization has been a frequently used policy prescription to
combat underdevelopment, corruption, and inefficient use of money in developing countries.
It is important, therefore, to understand how fiscal decentralization works and how it has
affected the countries that have implemented it. The intuition behind decentralization is that
a government closer to its constituents will have more accurate information about their tastes
and preferences. By extension, but perhaps not as obvious, local governments should be able
to use that information to produce public goods more efficiently than the central government.
Additional purported benefits of fiscal decentralization include less possibility of corruption,
greater participation in local government, and more equal distribution of wealth (Oates, 1972;
Smoke, 2001). Results of the many empirical studies on the effects of fiscal decentralization
in developing countries vary.
This thesis contributes to the growing body of empirical works studying the effects of fiscal
decentralization on developing countries. It examines the effects of fiscal decentralization on
health and education outcomes in Ethiopia. We test the responsiveness of local government to
local needs by examining effects of local education and health conditions on future government
spending decisions. Child immunization rates appear to significantly affect future government
spending decisions. Extending the analysis, we also test whether changes in health and educa-
tion spending affect health and education outcomes in the Amhara region. While the results
of this specification are largely inconclusive with regards to spending, we find that several
household characteristics affect outcomes.
The rest of this chapter gives an overview of the relevant political and institutional background
of Ethiopia. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on fiscal decentralization theory, presents positive
and negative aspects, sets forth institutional requirements and implementation strategies, and
reviews relevant empirical work. Chapter 3 develops a brief theoretical model, and chapter 4
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gives a detailed description of the data. Chapter 5 presents a formal data analysis. Finally,
chapter 6 concludes with a review of the results and suggestions for further research.
1.2 Ethiopia Background: Federalism from Menelik II to present
Ethiopia is the only country in Africa that was never officially colonized by an outside force.
That fact, however, has not insulated it from experiencing imperial rule by various ethnic
groups within its own borders. For 2000 years Ethiopia has been dominated by a nearly
continuous line of emperors, the majority of whom were either Axumite (from present day
Tigray) or Amharan. Under two Amharan emperors, Ethiopia underwent a strong centraliza-
tion process between 1889 and 1974. In 1974 the imperial rule was overthrown by a military
junta, known as the Derg. Their attempts at decentralization were unsuccessful, and Ethiopia
continued to be highly centralized until 1991, when a new era of so-called ethnic federalism
(Koehn and Ojo, 1996; Zewde and Pausewang, 2002; Young, 1998) began. Since then elections
have been held 6 times: in 1992, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2001, and 2005. Further fiscal decentral-
ization was apparent during this period, although violent oppression of the opposition by the
ruling party has increased since the most recent election.
1.2.1 Menelik II to Haile Selassie (1889 to 1974)
From 1889 until his death in 1913, the Amharan emperor Menelik II fought to expand the
borders of Ethiopia to its present day political boundaries by uniting provinces in the south,
east, and west of the Amhara region, finally defeating the Italians in Eritrea in 1896. An
agreement between Britain, France, and Italy in 1906 solidified Ethiopia’s legitimacy as a
country (Tronvoll, 2000, p. 12). The next emperor, Haile Haile Selassie, further concentrated
power toward the central government by usurping governing rights from regional nobility
(Young (1998), p. 192, Cohen and Koehn (1974), p. 2). Because of Ethiopia’s heterogeneous
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population, Tronvoll (2000) suggests the reason for strengthened centralization was to act
“as a counterweight to centrifugal—[moving or directed outward from the center]—forces
that threatened Ethiopia’s unity” (p. 13). In 1966, toward the end of his reign, Emperor
Selassie submitted a plan to parliament granting a certain level of autonomy to 50 awraja1
governments, but parliament failed to ratify that plan (Zewde and Pausewang, 2002, p. 134).
1.2.2 Mengistu and the Derg (1974-1991)
Opposition forces to Haile Selassie, led by a group of university students, pushed for an ethnic
federalism that would promote self-determination of the many ethnicities in the country.
This opposition was weary of both Amharan hegemony in government and Amharan students
privilege in the job market. And while they were effective in promoting ideals related to ethnic
federalism, this opposition group did not have the power to rule the country. A multi-ethnic
group of military officers known as the Derg—literally translated as committee or council
(Wikipedia, 2007)—broke away from the main body of the military and began to fulfill the
mandate given them by the Haile Selassie opposition. The Derg initially encouraged non-
Amharic language and cultures with the notion of a federalist Ethiopia in mind. Encountering
stiff resistance from regional elites, however, the ideal of ethnic federalism was abandoned by
1977 and the group came under the control of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Derg, under
the Communist Mengistu, once again moved toward centralized government (Young, 1998, p.
192).
Concerned with the Derg’s will and ability to enact a democratic agenda or represent the
country’s minority groups, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed in 1975.
Their initial goal was to liberate the Tigray region from oppression by Amhara. Accomplishing
that, they next focused on liberating other oppressed groups by toppling the Derg. Since a
federalist government of many ethnicities was their goal, the TPLF insisted that the best way
1a geographically-based administrative unit, equivalent to a present day zone
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to overthrow the Derg was with a multi-ethnic peasant movement. Enlisting peasants from
other ethnicities and regions, the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPRDF) was
born in 1989 (Tronvoll, 2000, p. 14). Among the groups under the umbrella of the EPRDF in
1991 were the TPLF, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Ethiopian
People’s Democratic Front (EPDF), and the Ethiopian Officers’ Revolutionary Movement
(EDORM) (Vaughan, 1994, p. 5). Adopted from Lenin’s attempt to provide autonomy to
minority groups in the former Russian Empire, the EPRDF’s notion of a federalist country
comprised of many ethnically divided states became a large part of the ethnic federalism that
materialized when the Derg was overthrown (Young, 1998, p. 193) (Turton, 2006, p. 2).
1.2.3 The EPRDF and Ethnic Federalism (1991-2006)
After overthrowing the Derg in May, 1991, the EPRDF convened The National Conference
on Peace and Reconciliation in July, where a transitional government was formed. Groups
from many different ethnicities and nationalities were encouraged to participate. In order
to participate, however, a group needed either to be ethnically-based or part of an armed
military organization. Because of this requirement, groups that had not previously existed
were thrown together for the occasion and were mostly headed by members of the local elite
(Aalen (2002) p. 7; Vaughan (1994) p. 38). In total, 28 parties participated, although
many groups were excluded because they did not meet the criteria. Though not a political
organization, and to the dismay of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF), a convoy from the University in Addis Ababa was invited to the
conference after a member of its faculty, Mesfin Wolde Mariam, published a paper entitled
An Ethiopian Peace Initiative. An outspoken critic of the conference, Mesfin is quoted as
saying “ ‘The conference was comprised for the most part of weak individuals who could be
manipulated by the EPRDF’ ” (Vaughan, 1994, p. 48). A similar criticism was leveled by the
general populous of the southern regions, accusing the OPDO and EPDF of being a façade to
cover the TPLF agenda of increased regional domination (Tronvoll, 2000, p. 15).
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The Transitional Charter drafted at the conference asserted “the right to self-determination
for nations, nationalities and peoples, the independence of Eritrea and the aim of establish-
ing elected regional administrations based on ethnic lines” (Aalen, 2002, p. 7), although
a clear distinction between “nations”, “nationalities”, and “peoples” was never made. Be-
cause the TPLF leader, Meles Zenawi, became president of the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia (TGE), and because two thirds of the Council of Representatives were from the
TPLF-EPRDF, “... the 1991 conference may not have resulted in a one party government
[although] its convention reflects to a large degree a one party dynamic” (Aalen, 2002, p. 7).
Elections were held in 1992 to satisfy the transitional condition of empowering local ethnic
and national groups by decentralizing authority, federalizing government structures, and giv-
ing local governments authority over local matters. Many called the elections unfair, however,
and the oppression of the OLF serves as evidence. Discrimination against family members,
beatings, and even killings of potential candidates from the OLF party were increasingly fre-
quent leading up to the elections. The OLF decided to withdraw from the elections, and
two days later they also withdrew from the TGE after most of its fighters were captured by
the EPRDF army and imprisoned (Pausewang et al., 2002, p. 32-33). Other major oppo-
sition parties, including the All Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO) and the Ethiopian
Democratic Action Group (EDAG) also boycotted the 1992 election (Young (1998), p. 195;
Pausewang et al. (2002), p. 33). After all of the pre-election mayhem, the results were hardly
surprising. Although there were three parties in the election, the EPRDF won 96.6% of the
vote, catalyzing protests that led to more members of the TGE being expelled, most notably
the EPDF (Aalen, 2002, p. 7).
The 1994 elections and following constitutional convention were not much better. The major
opposition parties once again boycotted the elections and there were reports of human rights
abuses (Young, 1998, p. 195). An anonymous independent observer of the process remarked,
“ ‘Constitution-making under the EPRDF has little in common with the bargaining, trade-
offs, and compromises that usually typify such processes; rather it reflects the weakness of the
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country’s democratic institutions, the political objectives of the governing party, and its posi-
tion of dominance within a state where serious opposition had been crushed or marginalized’
” (Tronvoll, 2000, p. 17). Nevertheless, a constitution arose.
Ratified at the December, 1994 convention, the constitution formally established a decentral-
ized government comprised of 9 regions2 and 2 chartered cities3. Additionally, the consti-
tution enumerated decision making powers for the central government, leaving regional and
municipal governments to administer everything else. However, ultimate authority lies with
the central government in the case of disputed law or practice. Elections then took place
in May 1995. Characterized by very low participation, the elections prompted independent
Norwegian observers to declare the voter apathy as “ ‘a form of popular resistance towards
the non-competitive election and the derailed democratization process’ ” (Pausewang et al.,
2002, p. 38).
National and regional elections next took place in 2000, with local elections occurring in 2001.
Pausewang et al. (2002) observed, first-hand, many irregularities in the 2000 election including
coercion, intimidation, and a mysterious absence of opposition candidates in some areas. Says
one resident of the Tigray region, “ ‘If I don’t vote on election day they [the TPLF] will come
and ask me and even take me out of my house... The candidates are not elected to alleviate
my problems. They are elected to be crowned [as kings]’ ” (Pausewang et al., 2002, p. 83).
Accordingly, opposition withdrew from the 2001 local elections, insisting that the elections
were rigged by the EPRDF and that it was pointless to participate in an election that was
not possible to win (Aalen, 2002, p. 8). Officials elected in local elections are those that make
woreda level spending decisions.
Four years passed before the next round of elections took place in 2005. Two new opposition
parties were created and quickly rose to prominence months before these elections. These two
parties, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic
2Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumaz, Gambela, Harari, Oromia, Somali, SNNPR, and Tigray
3Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa
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Forces (UEDF), were founded upon ethnic diversity. The focus of the CUD, in particular, was
national in scope and concerned with equitable economic development for all ethnicities. The
2005 elections initially promised a much more democratic process than previously observed in
Ethiopia. Pre-election debates were transparent and voter turnout was estimated at between
80 and 90 percent (Abbink, 2006, p. 183). Made public on September 5, 2005, the results
revealed that the CUD and UEDF secured remarkable gains (from 12 to 174 members of
parliament). Despite those gains, the CUD and UEDF were dissatisfied with the results
and, with the support of international observers, contested the outcomes of 299 districts. Of
those contested, only 39 were granted a recount because of dominant party influence in the
judicial system. Even then “many reruns of the vote were...even more controversial than the
first round” (Abbink, 2006, p. 184-185). When the EPRDF—the party of Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi—realized they were losing seats in Parliament, the outgoing government quickly
passed legislation minimizing the possible effects of opposition gains, including measures which
significantly increased the difficulty of presenting agendas before the governing body. In
addition, Zenawi banned public demonstrations for a month after elections. Defying this
ban, student and protest groups took to the streets, urged by the CUD to carry out peaceful
demonstrations. However, government soldiers were told to put down protests by any means
necessary, which led to many student protesters being killed and jailed (Abbink, 2006, p. 186).
With some facing facing the death penalty, those jailed were held captive until April 9, 2007,
when Judge Adil Ahmed determined that Ethiopian prosecutors had failed to prove their case
against them (BBC Online, April 9, 2007).
The political situation in Ethiopia has continued to deteriorate since the elections of 2005.
The authoritarian nature of the Meles regime has become increasingly apparent as more
foreign aid flows into the country. In the fall of 2005, 129 opposition members were jailed
for treason and planning genocide. Nervous about the gains made in the 2005 elections,
the Zenawi regime has been tightening central control in places such as Addis Ababa, where
the opposition parties enjoy popular support and won most of their Parliamentary seats
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(Economist Online, 2006). As of February 2007, there were still reports of dissidents being
jailed; many of these dissidents are teachers and students. And because of Ethiopia’s successful
military campaign against Somalia, they are receiving conflicting incentives from major donor
countries. The United States Congress, for example, is lambasting Ethiopia’s human rights
record while the Pentagon is funneling money to boost Ethiopia’s army (Economist Online,
Feb. 22, 2007). These questionable tactics by an increasingly iron-fisted regime has led to
the assertion that “centralist authoritarianism is not gone but is perhaps being reinvented in
a new form” (Abbink, 2006, p. 174).
1.2.4 Current Political Structure
While their tactics may seem authoritarian to much of the rest of the world, the current prac-
tices of the Ethiopian government appear democratic in comparison to the Derg. The capital
in Addis Ababa houses the central government. The country is divided into 9, ethnically
based, large regions, and 2 city regions. The administrative units within the large regions
are zones, which are further divided into woredas. Because regions are generally multi-ethnic,
woredas are assigned based on ethnicity to ensure the voices of all ethnic groups are heard.
The lowest recognized level of government, below the woreda, is the kebele—a village level
government in rural areas or a neighborhood level government in cities (Tronvoll, 2000, p. 20).
The official functions of the central government, as defined in the 1994 Constitution, include
national defense, foreign relations, monetary policy, and foreign investment. Power has been
devolved to regional governments to establish most administrative policies. In addition to
keeping a police force, regions are charged with maintaining the peace. Regional governments
are also responsible for carrying out economic, social, and development policies, as well as
forming their own budget, and caring for natural resources based on a nationally mandated
plan. The regional government also levies taxes, although the majority of the tax revenue
goes to the central government, where it is then redistributed back to the regions (Aalen,
2002, p. 55). Woreda level responsibilities are not well defined and differ among regions.
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Fiseha (2006) suggests that the there is a large gap between those responsibilities set forth
in the constitution and those actually in practice, making it difficult to generalize woreda
government responsibilities (p. 158).
The EPRDF rose to power on lofty ideals. Their aim was to transform Ethiopia into an
ethnically separate, but united government that promoted a progressive social agenda and
religious freedom within the country’s borders. They were determined to undermine narrow
special and corporate interests. And while the 1994 constitution dictates democratic elections
as the sole vehicle for bringing officials to office, nepotism is still widespread. Appointments
from the federal level all the way down to the kebele level are largely based upon dominant
party loyalty (Abbink, 2006, p. 177). Two years ago it appeared Ethiopia was heading toward
the most free election the country had seen to date. The events that followed the election,
however, have left in question the direction in which Ethiopia is headed.
On balance, Ethiopia is better suited for fiscal decentralization today than it was in 1991
during the conception of the constitution. However, recent trends toward a stronger cen-
tral government, increased voter intimidation practices (which decreased participation), and
suppression of political competition by the ruling EPRDF suggest steps away from both a
democratic government and ethnic federalism, on whose principles Ethiopian fiscal decentral-
ization relies. The strongest behavioral incentive packages, which could reverse the trend,
come from wealthy western donor nations and have proven perverse. In order to further
decentralize, Ethiopia must reverse the current trend of weakening institutions.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Fiscal Decentralization Theory
The literature on fiscal decentralization touts many benefits to developing nations from devolv-
ing budgetary control, one of which is the promise of more sensitive treatment of local needs by
increasingly local governments. Other potentially beneficial outcomes include increased par-
ticipation in government leading to a healthier democracy, increased macroeconomic stability,
increased autonomy in decision-making, and decreased corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002;
Smoke, 2001; 2003). Although these outcomes are not guaranteed in every case, there are
many theoretic arguments and examples of empirical support. However, there are also poten-
tial drawbacks to implementing fiscal decentralization. Excessive regulation, more restrictive
movement of capital, increased corruption, decreased fiscal transparency, and increased re-
gional disparities are all risks that must be weighed when implementing a decentralized fiscal
system (Tanzi, 2001).
Theory regarding fiscal decentralization has been developing for many years, beginning with
Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972), and Musgrave and Musgrave (1984). It has since evolved to
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more accurately fit present day needs, with subsequent scholars examining political, economic,
and institutional considerations (Besley and Coate, 2003; Lockwood, 2002; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2000; 2006; Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Oates, 1999; 2005).
In addition to theory there are many empirical works illustrating how effective decentral-
ized fiscal systems are. Faguet (2004) found that fiscal decentralization led to more sensi-
tive treatment of local needs in Bolivia. In the Philippines, Schwartz et al. (2002) observed
that fiscal decentralization led to increased allocation toward local healthcare budgets. Con-
versely, Zhang and Zou (1998) found that while fiscal decentralization in China varies between
provinces, the net results have been negative.
The rest of the chapter examines some of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
both for and against fiscal decentralization, in addition to looking at fiscal decentralization
in terms of a process. We begin by surveying the foundational fiscal decentralization theories
of Oates (1972), Musgrave and Musgrave (1984), and Tiebout (1956). Political economic
theories by Besley and Coate (2003), Lockwood (2002), and Tanzi (2001) follow, after which we
conclude the theory review with the institutional considerations of Bardhan and Mookherjee
(2000), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), and Platteau and Abraham (2002). We then use
the public expenditure theory of Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) to assign expenditure and
taxation responsibilities to different levels of government. The chapter ends with a review of
both general empirical studies and those that specifically pertain to the health and education
sectors.
2.1.1 Early Theory
Wallace Oates developed the seminal work on fiscal decentralization in 1972. The major as-
sumption underlying his theory is that a central government, due to imperfect information,
will produce a uniform level of public goods across districts. While uniform provision is appro-
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priate for goods with national benefits, such as national defense, it may be inappropriate for
goods that are local in scope, such as school funding and health clinic construction. Uniform
funding for health clinic construction, for example, may be inefficient because it ignores hetero-
geneous tastes and preferences across districts. Perhaps one community wants more funding
for health related activities, while another prefers the money spent on local schools. Local
governments can obtain better information about preferences, costs, and other idiosyncrasies
unique to their constituency, at a lower cost (Oates, 1972).
It follows that allocative efficiency “is attained by providing the mix of output that best reflects
the preferences of the individuals who make up society...” (Oates, 1972, p. 11). Further, by
allowing many different local governments to provide certain public goods, more creative
methods of provision at lower costs arise (Oates, 1972, p. 12). Many local governments will
find a way to best produce public goods for their respective constituents. These different
methods of production will be observed by neighboring districts, inducing competition to
find the best technology with which to produce the good. This in turn lowers the costs of
production.
From a public expenditure standpoint, Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) assert that public
goods should be produced by the level of government whose constituents benefit from that
provision. If the benefit is felt nationally, the public good should be produced by the central
government. If the benefit accrues at the local level, local governments should provide the
good. This is due not only to the informational advantage, but also because local governments
are closer to real resource costs. In the event of a positive spillover—a situation in which one
district benefits from the public goods provision of another district at no cost—the central
government is able to internalize that spillover with the least amount of transaction costs
(Smoke, 2001).
While Oates devised the first work on fiscal federalism, Charles Tiebout was certainly an
influence on Oates’ theory. Tiebout argues that residents will “vote with their feet” and move
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to a district where their preferred basket of public goods exists, increasing welfare gains (1956).
This theory is criticized as a phenomenon of the affluent American since the assumption of
perfect mobility is unrealistic in developing countries. Bewley (1981) suggests that although
Tiebout’s theory is reasonable, it is only applicable under assumptions which are so strict
that they essentially convert the public goods, to which residents will supposedly move, into
private goods.
2.1.2 Recent Theory
A more recent body of political economic work challenges one of the basic assumptions about
fiscal decentralization. That assumption suggests that the central government provides public
goods uniformly across districts. Besley and Coate (2003) assert that positive spillovers be-
tween districts represent a major drawback of fiscal decentralization. Instead of focusing on
the scope of a public good, they focus on the legislative process that allocates money to pub-
lic goods. They suggest a game theoretic framework which begins with a national legislature
comprised of local representatives. This legislature can be either non-cooperative—there are
gains to be had by cooperating—or cooperative—one whose goal is to maximize the welfare
of its constituents. If the legislature is non-cooperative, the winning coalition of legislators
determines public goods spending, leading to two potential results that are sub-optimal. The
first case is a misallocation of funds with the majority going to the winning coalition and
its constituents. Uncertainty is the second potential outcome. Since each district’s represen-
tative only affects policy if their policy is chosen, policy outcomes becomes random. Under
a non-cooperative legislature, the winning coalition of legislators dictate policy. Uncertainty
arises because voters do not know who will win when voting, so the quantity and quality of
public goods provision is in question. A cooperative legislature, on the other hand, produces a
sub-optimal level of public goods by providing more than the efficient amount of public goods.
This outcome produces the surplus maximizing level of public goods for its members, but not
the whole of the economy.
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Further, a high level of positive spillovers and homogeneous tastes across districts makes cen-
tralized government increasingly desirable regardless of how legislatures behave. As positive
spillovers decrease and tastes and preferences are increasingly heterogeneous, the case for de-
centralized public goods provision increases. Ultimately, Besley and Coate reach a conclusion
similar to that of Oates—that is, fiscal decentralization provides beneficial gains in provision
of locally accruing public goods. Extending the analysis, Lockwood (2002) concludes that
increased heterogeneity will yield increased efficiency for decentralized governments not be-
cause of uniform public good provision, but because of “inefficient choice of projects due to
cost-sharing and lack of responsiveness of the legislative process to benefits” (p. 333).
Fiscal decentralization is hardly a panacea. Excessive regulation, more restrictive capital
movement, corruption, decreased fiscal transparency, and regional disparities are just a few of
the potential risks of implementing fiscal decentralization. Excessive regulation in the form of
high local taxes may be due to a lack of transfers from the central government. Conversely,
districts may compete and lower taxes to an inefficient level to entice corporations to relocate.
At the national level, excessive regulation can also lead to more restrictive movement of labor
and capital, with districts imposing fees upon each other for things such as movement of
products. Finally, excessive regulation tends to occur under local leaders who suddenly find
themselves with more decision-making power than they are accustomed to (Tanzi, 2001).
While less corruption is a potential benefit of fiscal decentralization, increased corruption is
also a potential downfall. Because of a lower level of human capital in developing countries,
those with talent move to the private sector or the national government for higher wages. This
is indicative of a larger “brain drain” phenomenon—where talented individuals are drawn away
from less developed areas to more developed areas following promises of a better life or a larger
salary—that is especially problematic in developing countries. Two other related contributors
to corruption, enforcement and transparency in government, are also difficult when they are,
by definition, generally missing in corrupt governments (Tanzi, 2001, p. 7).
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Finally, regional disparities in ethnicity, language, and religion have the potential to persuade
decentralized regions to view themselves as separate and autonomous from the central gov-
ernment. When a sea port (Eritrea) or a large discovery of oil (Niger Delta in Nigeria) are at
issue, it can cause conflict or even separation from the central government to form an inde-
pendent government. These disparities can also cause problems when the central government
attempts to step in and redistribute wealth from affluent districts toward the poorer ones
(Tanzi, 2001, p. 6).
Institutional Considerations
The common downfall of fiscal decentralization is that it is not as effective without proper
institutions, such as competent government employees and some fiscal autonomy, in place.
A developing body of literature concerning accountability and capture by the local elite pro-
vides counterpoints to one of the supposed benefits of fiscal decentralization (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2000; 2006; Platteau and Abraham, 2002). Capture, in the context of fiscal de-
centralization, can be thought of as local elites or special interest groups manipulating elected
officials’ votes against the interest of the entire population. The touted benefit of locally
elected officials having a better idea of constituent preferences is, therefore, complicated by
the capture problem. This scenario is likely in Ethiopia and suggests that local governments
have a set of criteria, other than voter preference, by which expenditure decisions are made.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) explore the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized
public good provision in the context of capture at both levels of government. With this in
mind, welfare outcomes become dependent upon the avenues by which local governments
receive their funding. A more fiscally autonomous local government will result in expanded
public service levels, although inequality is also increased. The result is an ambiguous overall
outcome dependent upon the level of capture. If the local government has authority to fund
only those things through which benefit taxes—a tax whose burden is positively related to
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the benefits from the services it finances (Carroll and Yinger, 1994)—can be collected, then
welfare gains are restricted to the upper class and the poor are merely left just as well off as
they were before. If local governments are totally dependent upon the central government for
funding, then they are limited in their ability to cater to the elite, but they are also limited
when responding to unforeseen events.
Platteau and Abraham (2002) suggest that endogenous community imperfections, such as
entrenched tribalism and nepotism, outweigh the informational advantages gained by giving
local leaders the responsibility to allocate public goods, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (p.
2). Using a game theoretic model, they assert there is a multiple equilibria game played in local
politics with just one of the outcomes being cooperation. To minimize capture, a certain level
of institutional decentralization, such as training in how to run a government and participatory
development programs, must be in place before fiscal devolution of any kind occurs. In
addition, a central government needs to ensure that all the benefits of decentralization do not
accrue to only the educated local elite. This is especially true in societies where elite members
traditionally take their fill and distribute the leftovers to poorer members.
2.2 Fiscal Decentralization as a Process and a System
Prud’Homme (2003) suggests that “ ‘Decentralization’ is an ambiguous word because it refers
both to a system and a process” (p. 17). Because it is still young, decentralization in Ethiopia
is still in the midst of a journey from centralized to decentralized government. However,
because it has also been implemented, discussing it as a system is also relevant. We will
therefore examine fiscal decentralization as a process and as a system. To this end, it is
instructive to investigate the public expenditure work of Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) to
determine what role the government should play in the provision of different public goods
when markets fail. There are three key economic functions performed by the government:
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allocation, distribution, and macroeconomic stability.
Determining the distribution of public goods is a contentious part of public policy because
there is a tradeoff between efficiency and distributional equity. While efficiency is an innocuous
term, the definition of distributive justice—the arrangement of capital such that individuals
can attain some minimum standard, regardless of efficiency—hinges upon an inherently subjec-
tive definition of utility. Assuming that local governments display rational, utility maximizing,
behavior, the central government is in a better position to engage in disinterested distribution
of wealth among local governments (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984; Smoke, 2001). Further,
if redistribution programs are not uniform across districts, then mobile factors of produc-
tion will nullify attempts to redistribute wealth; in other words if each region or locale had
its own redistribution plan, factors of production would move to the location best suited to
their interests (Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). Additionally, local governments generally rely
on income regressive revenue sources. These revenue schemes tend to tax the rich too little
and over-tax the poor. To understand why, consider the case of a community that adopts a
strongly redistributive, or progressive, tax structure. The rich—including both families and
corporations—are taxed heavily in order to pay for public goods also used by the poor. The
rich, being the most mobile members of society, will move to a jurisdiction where they will not
be as heavily taxed. Theory says that the poor will move into the area; however, the poor,
not being as mobile as the rich, will be left without a tax base.
For it to be successful, a fiscal decentralization policy eventually must include greater, albeit
limited, autonomy in decision-making by local governments. Greater autonomy in decision-
making encourages local governments to experiment with different methods of public goods
provision. With a relatively large number of local governments providing public goods, po-
tential technical improvements arise. As in a competitive market, neighboring districts will
compete to adopt the most efficient production methods of public goods (Oates, 1972, p. 12).
Greater autonomy also leads to the potential advantage of greater participation in local gov-
ernment. Greater participation decreases the potential for self-serving members of the central
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government to misallocate funds (Smoke, 2001, p. 17).
There are three reasons macroeconomic stability is best handled by the central government.
First, developing countries are subject to significant macroeconomic fluctuations due to er-
ratic weather behavior and heavy dependence upon external sources for resources. Second,
because local governments have a relatively small role in the grand scheme of many developing
countries, they don’t account for a very large proportion of public sector jobs and spending.
Lastly, local governments are frequently dependent upon more fickle sources of income, such as
business taxes, and, consequently, their ability to behave counter-cyclically is limited (Smoke,
2001, p. 4).
On the other hand, central governments are in a better position to implement counter-cyclical
policies during bust and boom periods. There are two reasons that it is easier for national
governments to engage in monetary and fiscal policy. The first is economies of scale: lower
transactions costs are present when debt is issued on a larger scale. The second reason is that
national capital is highly mobile, whereas local capital is not (Oates, 1972; Tanzi, 2001).
The allocation function concerns the assignment of public goods provision to the appropriate
level of government based on efficiency. Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) and Oates (1972)
argue that public goods should be produced by the level of government to whose constituents
benefits accrue. If the benefit is felt nationally, the public good should be produced by the
central government. If the benefit accrues at the local level and not prohibitively costly, local
governments should provide the good.
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2.3 Empirical Literature
2.3.1 General Empirical Literature
Empirical evidence in support of fiscal decentralization theory is as plentiful as the evidence
against it. Drawing on evidence from a cross-country comparison between Brazil and China,
Shah (2006) asserts that fiscally decentralized governments more effectively support macroe-
conomic stabilization policy. A decentralized federalist state, Brazil’s superior political insti-
tutional structure enabled the central government to design macroeconomic policy with fiscal
decentralization in mind. Conversely, China’s unitary structure of government is in direct
competition with decentralization, creating an adversarial relationship between the central
government and decentralized governments. Foster and Rozenzweig (2004) note that decen-
tralized local governments in India are significantly more responsive to local needs when they
are given authority to collect income tax.
Although arbitrary, we begin our brief empirical observations by examining the fiscal decen-
tralization experience of West Bengal, which was nearly unambiguously positive. Proof of
increased participation by the poor in matters of local government exist, as well as household
survey evidence of increased levels of responsiveness to the needs of the poor. And while
Crook and Sverrisson (2001) also note improved social equality in West Bengal, they also
suggest that decentralization outcomes cannot be generalized across countries and regions.
Bryson and Cornia (2000) present the case of fiscal decentralization in the former state of
Czechoslovakia. Originating with similar institutions in place, their institutional similarities
diverged after independence from one another. While local Czech Republic governments
remain largely dependent upon the central government for funds, Slovakia has taken the
opposite approach and devolved so much fiscal responsibility that local governments receive
very little help from the central government. Ultimately, the Czech Republic economy is
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fairing much better after decentralization than its Slovakian counterpart, largely due to better
institutional planning.
China presents a good illustration of fiscal decentralization as a process. Beginning in the 1970s
and continuing through the 1990s, fiscal decentralization in China is unlike the devolution
frequently envisioned when fiscal decentralization is discussed. Decentralization is not uniform
across provinces; some are extremely decentralized while some are still very much in the control
of the center. Overall, fiscal decentralization negatively impacted provincial economic growth.
(Zhang and Zou, 1998).
2.3.2 Health and Education Empirical Literature
Given the mixed results presented so far, it is unsurprising that closer examination of health
and education outcomes due to decentralization are similarly ambiguous. While there is
ample analysis regarding the effect of decentralization on health, empirical work regarding
decentralization’s effect on education is limited.
In Bolivia, Faguet (2004) shows that certain public goods, including education, water and
sanitation, urban development, and water management, display different investment patterns
after decentralization. Specifically, education local government spending rose by over 25%
after decentralization while health spending decreased slightly. Using the change in invest-
ment patterns resulting from fiscal decentralization at both the national and local levels, he
concludes that decentralization led to more sensitive treatment of local needs in the aforemen-
tioned sectors, while the effect on health spending was inconclusive. Further evidence shows
the poorest districts allocating large percentages of spending toward their highest priority
projects were the major driver behind these overall changes.
Extending the work of Akin et al. to the Philippines, Schwartz et al. (2002) found that although
local health expenditures increased both in magnitude and budget share, the public types of
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health care services decreased, implying that public spending on privately beneficial health
care increased. Using data from over 1600 local governments they concluded that local public
health spending decreased following decentralization and stayed below pre-decentralization
levels for the three year period following decentralization which the study examined. Regard-
ing health care behaviors, family planning was positively impacted at both the provincial and
local level by public health spending. Child immunizations, however, showed less significant
evidence of being positively impacted by increased public health spending.
A neighbor of Ethiopia and perhaps the most similar in terms of geographic location and
institutional characteristics, Uganda has been relatively well-studied regarding the impacts of
fiscal decentralization on public good provision, with emphasis on health. Akin et al. (2005)
discovered that aggregate regional primary health care expenditures, over a period of three
years, actually fell from nearly 33% of the total budget to less than 16%. Similarly, spending
on non-illicit drugs fell by half. Spending on information, education, and communication
doubled, while spending on comparatively private activities, such as government salaries and
monitoring and evaluation rose during that time period as well. This study also concluded that
districts will change their allocative health spending behavior based on the way neighboring
districts behave due to the spillover effect. If a district is experiencing a positive spillover
from another district, the first district has no incentive to keep providing the same level of
public good provision. This free-rider problem appears to magnify over time and be especially
evident in the health budgets of neighboring districts.
Also in Uganda, Hutchinson et al. (2003) found that decentralization led to increases in
secondary—curative—healthcare with a potential price of decreased primary—preventative—
healthcare. Similar to the first case, this outcome suggests that private benefits are being
provided with public money. Two interesting explanations for why priorities in health spending
may have changed post-decentrazliation arise from this study. The first is HIV/AIDS: more
people need secondary and tertiary care. The second is donor preferences: donors may be
earmarking more money toward this problem and others with strictly curative aims in mind.
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Yet another reason for the under-provision of health care by local governments may be due
to the free-rider problem associated with spillovers from neighboring districts.
Lastly, Jeppsson (2001) finds that decentralization may actually decrease funding allocation
to healthcare unless that money is earmarked by the central government. This undermines
decentralization by eliminating local decision making. Using the 1995/1996 fiscal year as a
model, the Ugandan Ministry of Finance created a “shadow budget” for the 1996/1997 fiscal
year whose purpose was to estimate how much money district governments would spend on
primary health care. The shadow budget estimated that districts would spend nearly four
times what they actually spent in 1996/1997. While districts allocated substantially more to
primary health care for the 1997/1998 fiscal year, they still fell short of the shadow budget
from the previous year.
2.4 Summary
This literature review began by discussing Oates’ theory on fiscal decentralization. By assum-
ing that central governments will provide a uniform level of public goods, Oates asserts that
local governments will more efficiently provide local public goods because they have better
information about heterogeneous tastes and preferences. This makes sense in the context of an
ethnically diverse country such as Ethiopia. Next, we explored a more recent body of political
economic literature that reaches a similar conclusion to Oates’, but replaces the static central
government with a dynamic, bureaucratic, legislature comprised of locally elected officials that
solve inter-district spillover problems internally.
Each unique fiscal decentralization program depends heavily upon the institutions in which
they are conceived. Competent and honest local government officials, a strong yet respectful
central government, a limited ability to wage benefit-taxes for local spending, and a willingness
to discard traditional and tribal methods of governance are all institutional components that
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aid in a successful fiscal decentralization program. The theory section ended with a discussion
on fiscal roles each level of government should play. Macroeconomic stability and inter-
governmental distribution are best handled by the central government while allocative duties
should be filled by local governments.
Empirical tests of fiscal decentralization programs around the world yield mixed results that
are not easily generalizable. Results from China indicate a drag on economic productivity
as a result of decentralization, while the West Bengal experience is unambiguously positive.
Bolivia shows mostly positive, but mixed results, as does Uganda. The common theme among
them all is the substantial role played by institutions in place when fiscal decentralization is
implemented.
While there are many potential disadvantages and risks inherent in fiscal decentralization,
policy makers generally believe that the benefits outweigh the risks, as is evidenced by the
sustained prescription of fiscal decentralization by economists to developing countries. The
promise of increased allocative efficiency, increased participation, increased political stability,
increased autonomy in decision making, and decreased corruption outweigh the potential
downfalls of excessive regulation, more restrictive capital movement, corruption, decreased
fiscal transparency, and regional disparities.
Chapter 3
Theoretical Model
The previous chapter explored some of the fiscal decentralization and public finance theory
relevant to this study and put it in the context of health and education outcomes. This chapter
develops a theoretical model, beginning by laying a theoretical groundwork and proceeding
to econometric specifications that model health and education outcomes as a result of fiscal
decentralization. We conclude with a brief discussion of expectations.
Fiscal decentralization is the process by which local governments acquire greater control over
taxing and spending from a higher level of government. With the theory of Oates (1972)
as a basis, efficiency is the mix of public taxing and spending that maximizes utility for its
constituents. Local governments will produce local public goods more efficiently than the cen-
tral government because they have access to more complete information about constituents’
heterogeneous tastes and preferences. Additionally, voting with their feet, constituents en-
courage greater efficiency from local governments. Greater experimentation and innovation
through competition among local governments also contributes to efficiency, as does local gov-
ernments’ close proximity to real resource costs. Based on empirical works by Hutchinson et
al. (2003) and Faguet (2004), we proxy for fiscal decentralization by developing a model to
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examine whether existing conditions affect future local spending decisions, and also, whether
local spending affects future local outcomes.
One reason local governments attain more efficient local public goods provision than higher
levels of government is that they have an informational advantage. Because of their proximity
to constituents, local governments can more cheaply and effectively collect information on
local preferences and needs. To illustrate, think about a hypothetical situation in Amhara
where primary educational attainment rates are decreasing in 5 woredas. Voters in the 2 of
the 5 woredas exhibit a strong voter preference for high educational attainment, while the
other 3 woredas are indifferent about educational attainment. A central government may look
at these results and decide that all 5 woredas need increased educational money because they
are underperforming, thus ignoring heterogeneous preferences. Even if they didn’t ignore
individual preferences, collecting this information would require the central government to
expend additional resources, in the form of time and money, to collect, compile, and use
this information to enact regulation similar to that of the woreda governments. Ideally,
fiscally decentralized woredas would use this information to justify a corresponding increase
or decrease in spending on education the following year, based on their respective voters’
preference. However, (Fiseha, 2006, p. 136) suggests that in Ethiopia, preferences of local
elites are expressed instead of voter preferences. The presence of large amounts of donor
funding also increases the possibility of donor preference being revealed.
Another efficiency advantage of local governments in the provision of local public goods is
that they are closer to real resource costs. A local government that collects its own revenue
for a good through taxation is more likely to realistically consider the costs, as well as the
benefits, of providing that good. Consider a rural village in Amhara. The nearest health
clinic is 25 kilometers away, so the woreda government determines that a health clinic needs
to be constructed. If the central government gives the woreda money and tells it to build a
clinic, the woreda government has the incentive to use all of that money and health spending
will increase independently of local preferences. However, if the clinic is funded through local
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taxation, the residents of the woreda who are taxed for the clinic, through voting, will give the
government a reason to build the clinic at the lowest possible cost, and spending will increase
according to local preferences.
Funding local public works projects at the lowest possible cost induces competition among
woredas to find the lowest cost method of production, increasing efficiency and welfare gains.
For example, take educational attainment across woredas. Assume that the constituents of
woreda A and woreda B have similar preferences and attainment goals for education. If
woreda A meets its attainment goals at a lower cost than woreda B, the latter will most
likely adopt the methodology of the former. Ultimately, woreda B is able to decrease its
educational spending while enjoying improved educational attainment outcomes because of
the competition that occurs under decentralization.
Finally, constituents will move to another woreda, or vote with their feet, if they do not
like the public goods bundle in their present woreda. Consider a woreda whose main public
spending goal is to build a hospital in the hope of lowering the incidence of diarrhea and fever
among children. In order to raise money for the hospital, the government taxes its residents.
Now suppose a family who lives in this woreda has a strong preference for education and an
aversion to high taxes and hospitals. Taking only economic preferences into consideration,
that family will move to a woreda that better suits its preference bundle. The families that
remain will reap the benefits, in the form of lower diarrhea and fever rates among children, of
their tax-funded hospital. While this scenario is highly unrealistic for a country like Ethiopia
where mobility is unlikely and constituent preference is rarely expressed, it is nevertheless a
useful illustrative tool.
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3.1 Empirical Method
Using two different specifications, we measure whether local conditions have an effect on
future woreda level spending and also whether woreda level spending has an effect on future
local outcomes. This study builds off the model of Faguet (2004), who examines whether
or not fiscal decentralization leads to more sensitive treatment of local needs. Specifically,
we examine the education and health sectors in the context of spending and public goods
provision. The first specification uses a fixed effects ordinary least squares regression to test
whether local conditions, such as child vaccination rates and primary school attainment, affect
future local government spending patterns. The second specification examines whether or not
spending and household characteristics have any effect on future local outcomes.
3.1.1 The Effect of Local Conditions on Future Expenditure Decisions
Government spending on public goods should reflect public conditions and household char-
acteristics at the local level from the preceding time period. In the context of health sector
spending, these conditions may include things like the rate of vaccinations for children1 and ac-
cess to clean drinking water. In the context of education spending, conditions include primary
and secondary school attainment as well as enrollment and literacy rates. These conditions
are denoted by Cw1996, with w representing a unique woreda. Ewt is spending by local gov-
ernments on education and health as a percentage of the total budget. Again, w is a unique
woreda and t is a particular year, assuming values from 1998-2001. Education spending is that
money spent on things like teacher and administrator salaries, students, and facilities. Ex-
amples of health spending include money used toward clinics, malaria/vector-borne diseases,
doctor and nurse salaries, and medicines. The first specification is:
1Ideally we would use actual rates of disease, but data limitations prevent this.
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Ewt = β1 + β2t + β3tCw1996 + εwt (3.1)
One of the World Bank’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is universal primary ed-
ucation (2006). Assuming that central government policy is influenced by the MGDs and a
trickle-down effect to local government spending, if school enrollment targets for the year are
not met, we expect education spending to increase the following year. Similarly, if enrollment
targets are met or exceeded for the year, we expect the subsequent education budget share to
stay constant or decrease. Additionally, we presume an increased adult literacy rate will pos-
itively affect healthcare spending as well as all levels of education spending. While household
toilet access and access to drinking water are important to include in the model, we do not
know what, if any, effect the two will have on healthcare or education spending at the local
level. A full list of expectations is presented in table 3.1.
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Another of the World Bank’s Millennium Development Goals is to “combat HIV/Aids, malaria,
and other diseases” (2006). DPT and BCG vaccinations are given to children in Ethiopia to
combat “other diseases”—tuberculosis, diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus. Ideally, we would
obtain actual disease rates, but limitations in data necessitate using vaccination rates as a
proxy. Because a lower level of disease is partially a result of higher vaccination rates, we
expect a positive relationship between DPT and BCG vaccination rates and health spending,
assuming there is also a preference for DPT and BCG vaccinations. In other words, if disease
is on the rise, vaccination rates should also rise along with health spending.
3.1.2 The Effects of Spending on Outcomes
If local government spending on public goods reflects voter preferences, it follows that behav-
iors and outcomes should change in response to that spending. In particular, behaviors and
outcomes related to health and education should change in response to changes in spending
within their respective sectors. Mwt is a condition such as the percentage enrollment among
school aged children. Ewt again denotes spending within a specific sector. New to this spec-
ification is X, a vector of average household characteristics which could also possibly affect
outcomes. These household characteristics include things such as proportion of the sample
that is married and working, and average household size. The second specification is a simple
ordinary least squares estimate, with outcome as the dependent variable and independent
variables consisting of lagged expenditures and household characteristics.
The general form of this specification is expressed below as:
Mwt = α1 + α2Ew,(t−1) + β
′Xwt (3.2)
We suppose that a change in local expenditure in the past will affect outcomes in the present.
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For example, an increase in health spending should cause a decrease in the percentage of chil-
dren experiencing diarrhea and fever. Similarly, an increase in educational spending should
increase enrollment and the percentage of the population completing their primary or sec-
ondary education.
We can draw inferences about the true nature of the effectiveness of local government spending
in Amhara, and by extension, Ethiopia, from these specifications. In particular, if there is a
lack of, and preference for, something locally, and it is not receiving an increasing amount of
funding over time, local government spending may not be an effective means toward achieving
its goals. Alternatively, if the need is being met by increasing local spending in that area, local
government spending is probably effective. Results from the two specifications just presented
are revealed in chapter 5.
Armed with a firm grasp of how to apply fiscal decentralization theory to a messy data set,
we proceed to the next chapter. Our data originated from the Amhara region of Ethiopia,
and is useful in preparation for developing an empirical specification, and also for examining
time trends of outcomes, conditions, and expenditures at the woreda level in both education
and healthcare.
Chapter 4
Empirical Evidence: The Data
4.1 Data description
This study analyzes two different data sets. The first data set is composed of four surveys
of thousands of Ethiopian households. The Ethiopian Welfare Monitoring Surveys (EWMS)
were conducted by The Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) in 1996, 1998, 2000,
and 2004. The 2004 survey, similar in structure to the others but chosen because it is the
most exhaustive, begins on page 65. The subject of questions cover individual characteristics,
household characteristics, education, health conditions, housing amenities, access to facilities,
household assets, and living conditions. Since this study is concerned with educational and
health related outcomes, those questions are the focus of the analysis.
Of the nine regions in Ethiopia, Amhara is analyzed because the second data set contains
Amharan budget outlays for 1998 - 2001. Ethiopia’s relatively young constitution, written in
1994, implicitly included fiscal decentralization, and it has been evolving since. There were
no defining events in Ethiopian fiscal decentralization from 1998 - 2001; rather, like any new
government process, we expect improvements and learning with the passage of time (Foster
33
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and Rozenzweig, 2004). Therefore, spending should be more decentralized in 2001 than in
1998 because of local events and the passage of time.
The focus of this study, the Amhara region, is divided into 11 zones, one of them being
a special woreda-zone (Bahir Dar Zuria). The special woreda-zone was created to protect
minority groups within a hegemonic region. Within the remaining 10 zones lie 102 woredas
(Aalen, 2002, p. 66). As of 2005, the population of Amhara was nearly 90% rural, accounting
for nearly a quarter of Ethiopia’s livestock output (Central Statistical Agency, 2007).
Table 4.1 shows individual and household characteristics and conditions from 60 Amharan
woredas. Incidence of fever and diarrhea in children under the age of 5 increased from 29%
in 1996 to 31% in 2000 and declined to 26% in 2004, with a net 3% decline over the 8 year
period. Over the same time period, the percentage of children under 5 receiving the Bacille
Calmette-Guérin vaccine (BCG)1 and the Diphtheria, Pertussis, Tetanus vaccine (DPT)2
increased substantially, from a 33% vaccination rate in 1996 to 55% and 60% in 2000 and
2004, respectively. The proportion of households with access to toilets increased substantially
from 7.6% in 1996 to 26.5% in 20043. Finally, household access to clean drinking water, the
other health indicator, increased substantially over the 8 year period, up from 41.5% in 1996
to 67% during the dry season in 2000 and 77% during the dry season in 2004.
While overall health outcomes were unambiguously positive, educational outcomes showed
mixed results. Grades 1-8 (ages 7-14) compose primary school in Ethiopia, while grades
9-12 (ages 15-18) are classified as secondary school (World Bank, 2003; Schaffner, 2004).
Enrollment rates among children aged 7-18 years displayed impressive gains, increasing from
20% in 1996 to around 37% in 2004. Similarly, primary school completion rates doubled from
10.4% in 1996 to 19.7%in 2004. However, the proportion of the population having completed
1This is the most common vaccine against tuberculosis and also a common health indicator among children.
2DPT vaccine is a common health indicator among children.
3The proportion of households with access to a toilet briefly sank to 1.6% in 2000, while primary school
completion rates also experienced a decline in 2000. Other education and health outcomes experienced similar
setbacks in 2000, leading us to believe that there are problems with the survey data from that year.
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secondary education was stagnant to slightly decreasing across the time period.
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Because this analysis consists of examining behavioral changes with respect to expenditures,
it is also instructive to examine woreda level spending patterns over time. Figure 4.1 displays,
in a simplified manner, proportions of the total budget comprised by education spending,
healthcare spending, and everything else. It is important to keep in mind that education
spending, as a percent of total spending, is 5 times larger than that of healthcare spending,
and that together they comprise over 60% of total budgetary outlays.
37.57%
10.29%
52.14%
37.18%
10.15%
52.66%
37.09%
10.55%
52.37%
38.88%
10.27%
50.85%
1998 1999
2000 2001
Spending by sector Spending by sector
Spending by sector Spending by sector
Remainder of Budget Total Health
Total Education
Graphs by Year
Figure 4.1: Woreda Budgets: Percent expenditure per sector by year
Figure 4.2 shows a density histogram of changes in education spending as a percent of the total
budget over the period 1998-2001. The height of each bar represents the number of woredas
that have spending changes corresponding with the range of values spanning the width of the
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bar. For example, it appears that there were approximately 7 woredas whose percent change
in education spending was between 0 and -.1, meaning that education spending as a percent
of total woreda expenditures fell from 1998-2001. Similarly, figure 4.3 shows a histogram
of changes in health spending as a percent of the total budget over the period 1998-2001.
For both charts, a negative bar means that woreda governments within that range allocated
less of its total budget toward that sector over the time period. Conversely, a positive bar
indicates the local government increased the proportion of its budget allocated toward the
sector. Finally, a woreda at zero suggests no change.
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Change in spending
Percent change in woreda education spending:1998!2001
Figure 4.2: Percent change in education expenditure per woreda from 1998-2001
The majority of the area under the bars in figure 4.2 are negative and fairly close to zero,
meaning that overall there was a net decrease in education spending as a percent of all woreda
budgets in Amhara. If change in spending patterns acts as a proxy for decentralization, we
can imagine a few reasons for the decrease in the portion of the budget allocated to education.
Recall that one benefit of fiscal decentralization is that voter preferences are expressed more
effectively. The decrease in educational spending, therefore, may be because voters want
spending to be allocated to different sectors of the economy. More likely, it could also mean
that the regional government is in control of the spending and has noticed a need for less
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Figure 4.3: Percent change in health expenditure per woreda from 1998-2001
education spending, or it could be indicative of capture by local elites.
According to figure 4.34 and contrary to education spending, health spending as a percent of
all total woreda budgets increased from 1998-2001, as is evidenced by observing that most
of the area below the bars is positive. This could be due to the government’s health clinic
building boom.
4.2 Analysis
Having examined changes in outcomes and expenditures independently, it is now useful to
explore how expenditures and outcomes interact. Table 4.2 is a correlation matrix between
the percentage of the total woreda budgets spent on healthcare each year from 1998 - 2001 and
local outcomes from 1996 interacted with a time variable. The interaction term, t, weights
each outcome term based on the time period of expenditure with which it is interacting.
4There is a woreda that, due to the construction of a hospital, had a 4000% increase in spending, and will
be addressed later. It was dropped for this chart because it obscured all trends.
4.2. ANALYSIS 40
While the values are arbitrary, t assumes the value of 1 for 1998, 2 for 1999, 3 for 2000, and
4 for 2001. The function of the time interaction term is to separate the correspondence of
the outcome (which is the same value for every year within each woreda) with expenditure
from each year. There are four observations for each woreda, one for each expenditure year
interacted with the 1996 outcomes. This allows us to observe a spending trend over time
correlated with the 1996 outcome. For example, BCG vaccination has a .1830 correlation
with education spending. This means that 1996 BCG vaccination rates and the percentage of
the total budget that comprises education spending from 1998-2001 vary positively together
18.3% of the time; in other words, they are weakly and positively correlated.
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Table 4.3 is a similar correlation matrix instead using the percentage of total woreda bud-
gets spent on education. Health spending is actually negatively correlated with both BCG
and DPT vaccination rates, while education spending is positively correlated with the two.
Graphically, figures 4.4 & 4.5 suggest that as the proportion of the total budget allocated to
education spending increases, so does the proportion of children under 5 years of age vacci-
nated against tuberculosis, but this holds nothing else constant.
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Figure 4.4: Correlation between percent woreda education spending (1998-2001) and 1996
BCG vaccination rates
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Figure 4.5: Correlation between percent woreda health spending (1998-2001) and 1996 BCG
vaccination rates
Noting the high correlation between health outcomes, we can talk about them together. One
explanation for the discrepancy in health and education spending effects may lie in the method
by which vaccines are distributed. While there is no specific evidence for this, woredas may
decide that schools are the best place to administer the BCG vaccine and may allocate a
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portion of their education budget to purchasing and administering the vaccine. This would
indicate the presence of a positive spillover from the education sector to the health sector.
Another explanation is that the BCG vaccination program is not a large part of the health
budget, rendering the interaction between the two small, albeit negative.
The correlation matrices also disclose some interesting information about educational attain-
ment. Behrman (1996) suggests that not only do healthy children have higher enrollment
rates, they also achieve more highly once they are at school. So it is a bit surprising to
note that while education spending is positively correlated with both primary and secondary
school attainment, health spending is negatively correlated with primary school attainment.
One possible reason for this is that if vaccinations are administered at school, children will
attend just to obtain the vaccine and then drop out.
Because it exhibits more irregularities than education spending, healthcare spending deserves
further examination at this point. We can reasonably expect healthcare spending to be neg-
atively correlated with future incidence of childhood fever and diarrhea rates. While that is
indeed the case, it is initially difficult to discern because of a statistically anomalous woreda.
Concurrent examination of figures 4.6 and 4.7 confirm this.
Figure 4.6 shows a correlation scatter plot of the percent change in incidence of diarrhea and
fever in children under 5 from 2000-2004 on the percent change in healthcare spending from
1998-2001. In this plot, there appears to be an outlier. The woreda, Debay Tilatgen, had a
large increase in spending over the expenditure time period for the construction of a hospital.
This outlier makes it hard to distinguish what is occurring in the rest of the woredas and
alters the trend line. With the outlier excluded, figure 4.7 shows a clear trend that looks as
it should, suggesting that as percent change in health spending increases, the percent change
in incidence of fever and diarrhea decrease in the future.
While a cursory data analysis is instructive, none of it holds other variables constant. This
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Figure 4.6: Correlation between percent change in health spending from 1998 - 2001 and
percent change in incidence of childhood fever and diarrhea from 2000-2004: outlier present
!.
5
0
.5
1
Pe
rc
en
t c
ha
ng
e 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
 h
ea
lth
 s
pe
nd
in
g:
19
98
!2
00
1
!1 0 1 2 3 4
Change in incidence of diarrhea and fever:
2000!2004
95% CI Fitted values
Woreda Health Spending
Figure 4.7: Correlation between percent change in health spending from 1998 - 2001 and
percent change in incidence of childhood fever and diarrhea from 2000-2004: no outlier
chapter shows that while education spending as a percentage of total budget outlays is on
the decrease, health spending as a percentage of total spending is slightly increasing. At the
same time, most health and education outcomes, such as vaccination rates and primary school
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completion rates, are on the increase. While voter preference may be the cause, it is more likely
that Non Governmental Organization (NGO) preference is being expressed. There is also a
negative relationship between incidence of childhood diarrhea and fever, and health spending.
This may be indicative of effective health spending techniques and distribution. Finally, while
there is a negative correlation between BCG vaccination rates and health spending, education
spending and BCG vaccinations rates are positively related. The next chapter will develop an
empirical method and apply the principle of ceteris paribus via regression analysis to present
more rigorous results.
Chapter 5
Empirical Evidence: Method and
Results
To continue the analysis from the previous chapter, we inspect the results reached by applying
the theory presented in chapter 3 to the data explored in chapter 4. Primary specification re-
sults suggest that local conditions did not significantly affect local government spending, with
a few notable exceptions in the health and education sectors. Secondary specification results
were unambiguously disappointing and did not suggest significant effects of local spending
on local outcomes. The chapter concludes with possible explanations for why results do not
match expectations.
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5.1 Results
5.1.1 Do present conditions affect future expenditure decisions?
Recall that equation 3.1 on page 29 tests whether observed conditions affect future woreda
spending patterns. All conditions were interacted with a time variable, t, to isolate the effects
of the condition on each individual year of spending. Consequently, each woreda has 4 terms
for each condition, one for each year of spending, which explains why there are 240 (60 woredas
times 4 conditions years per condition) observations. Each specification is run two different
ways, which we will denote variation 1 and variation 2. The first variation includes all 9
independent variables from both education and health sectors. The second variation uses
only those independent variables which correspond to the sector of the dependent variable.
For example, given percent of education spending as the dependent variable, there are two
variations. The first includes all 9 independent variables while the second variation includes
only the education sector independent variables representing enrollment, literacy rates, and
primary and secondary completion rates. Table 5.1 presents a comprehensive list of spending
and condition variables.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 present the full results of effects of fixed 1996 woreda conditions on woreda
level spending decisions from 1998-2001. Table 5.2 shows the effects of 9 different health
and education conditions on 3 different kinds of health spending as a percentage of the total
budget. Table 5.3 shows how the same 9 health and education conditions affect 3 different
types of education spending as a percentage of the total budget.
Table 5.2 on page 52 displays results that provide mixed support for local conditions affect-
ing future government spending. Areas with low DPT vaccination rates suggest increased
healthcare spending. A one percentage point decrease in children receiving the DPT vacci-
nation results in a 1.8 percentage point increase in health spending as a percentage of the
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Table 5.1: Variable descriptions for the first specification
Variable Description
Ewt Expenditure at time t (1998-2001) for woreda w
Healthcare spending as a percentage of total budget
Health clinic spending as a percentage of total budget
Malaria spending as a percentage of total budget
Education spending as a percentage of total budget
Primary education spending as a percentage of total budget
Secondary education spending as a percentage of total budget
Cw1996 Fixed 1996 conditions in woreda w
Percentage of population who completed primary school
Percentage of school aged population enrolled in school
Percentage of population who completed secondary school
Percentage of children under 5 who were ill with diarrhea or fever in
the two weeks prior to being surveyed
Percentage of children under 5 who received the BCG vaccine
Percentage of children under 5 who received the DPT vaccine
Percentage of the population over 15 that can read and write
Percentage of the population with access to a toilet
Percentage of the population with access to clean drinking water
*Only a single variable in Ewt appears in each regression
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total budget, holding all else constant. This is significant at the 5% level. Similar results
are seen in variation 1, as well as for both variations of health clinic spending. Additionally,
access to toilets seems to affect health spending as well. The first variation shows that a 1
percentage point increase in the proportion of the population with access to a toilet yields a
2.9 percentage point increase in health clinic spending as a percent of the total budget, all
else constant and significant at the 10% error level. The results are even more significant (at
the 1% level) under the second variation, exhibiting a 1 percentage point increase in the toilet
access rate that yields a 2.3 percentage point increase in health clinic spending as a percent
of the total budget, ceteris paribus. Caution should be taken in putting too much faith in the
results involving toilet access, as we will see later.
Table 5.3 on page 53 displays some interesting results on education sector spending. A 1
percentage point increase in DPT vaccination rates yields a 2.5 percentage point decrease in
education spending as a percent of the total budget, holding all else constant and significant at
the 5% level. An identical increase in DPT vaccination rates yields a 1.7% decrease in primary
education spending as a percent of the total budget at 5% significance, ceteris paribus. The
effect of the BCG vaccination on spending, however, complicates these results. A 1 percentage
point increase in BCG vaccination rates yield a 2.5 percentage point increase in education
spending as a percentage of total budget outlays, all else constant and significant at 5%.
This may be because an emphasis on meeting the Millennium Development Goal of universal
primary education diverts attention and funding from secondary education. Alternatively,
perhaps there is a societal norm that makes primary school a rite of passage, but secondary
school a place for the wealthy. A more likely explanation is that primary education is too
expensive for local governments Additionally, a 1 percentage point increase in the percentage
of the population that has completed primary school yields a 3.7 percentage point decrease
in secondary school spending under variation 1, ceteris paribus. This is significant at the 1%
level, with a similar result under variation 2.
Nothing else was significant in the first variation of regressions. Recall that table 4.2 on
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Table 5.2: Fixed Effects Results for Health Sector Spending
% Health % Clinic % Malaria
spending spending spending
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
time 0.00649** 0.00495** 0.00296 0.00421*** -0.0000275 0.0000871
(2.56) (2.35) (1.25) (2.65) (-0.14) (0.69)
enrollment 0.0146 0.00737 0.000565
rate (1.03) (0.73) (0.85)
literacy -0.0218 0.00502 -0.000977
rate (-1.43) (0.38) (-0.62)
diarrhea & 0.00681 0.00678 0.00398 0.00333 -0.000326 -0.000480
fever (1.08) (1.10) (0.85) (0.71) (-0.66) (-1.06)
BCG 0.00187 0.00390 -0.00105 0.00185 -0.000724 -0.000393
vaccination (0.25) (0.70) (-0.22) (0.52) (-1.11) (-0.60)
DPT -0.0157* -0.0181** -0.0123** -0.0136*** 0.000224 0.0000202
vaccination (-1.91) (-2.57) (-2.22) (-2.65) (0.30) (0.03)
toilet -0.00820 0.00260 0.0291* 0.0227*** 0.000144 0.000776
access (-0.44) (0.18) (1.72) (4.16) (0.15) (1.11)
drinking water -0.00434 -0.00328 -0.0000306 -0.000543 -0.000124 -0.000145
access (-0.85) (-0.67) (-0.01) (-0.21) (-0.51) (-0.62)
primary 0.00404 0.00275 0.00282
school (0.17) (0.15) (1.44)
secondary 0.0313 -0.0674 -0.00154
school (0.39) (-1.02) (-0.27)
constant 0.0955*** 0.0955*** 0.0569*** 0.0569*** 0.00196*** 0.00196***
(28.13) (28.03) (25.39) (25.38) (8.78) (8.77)
N 240 240 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
page 41 and table 4.3 on page 43 suggest that there is high correlation among some of the
independent variables. Additionally, there is simply not much variation in spending over time,
which adds a layer of complexity in obtaining significant results. To determine whether this
is true, another set of regressions were run. We regress each independent variable separately
against each level of spending. Table B.1 on page 78 shows the condensed results of these
regressions, while tables B.2 through B.7 on pages 79 through 82 display the individual results
by sector.
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Table 5.3: Fixed Effects Results for Education Sector Spending
% Education % Primary Education % Secondary Education
spending spending spending
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
time -0.00531** -0.00355* -0.00704** -0.00486** 0.00351*** 0.00364***
(-2.11) (-1.68) (-2.46) (-2.37) (2.62) (3.62)
enrollment -0.0223 -0.0142 -0.0120 -0.0109 0.00666 0.00894
rate (-1.65) (-1.14) (-0.89) (-0.90) (1.01) (1.64)
literacy 0.0203 0.0172 0.0292 0.0197 0.000511 0.00330
rate (1.08) (0.96) (1.23) (0.92) (0.05) (0.34)
primary -0.0232 -0.0246 -0.00372 -0.00312 -0.0373*** -0.0380***
school (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.12) (-0.10) (-2.65) (-3.07)
secondary -0.0199 0.0234 -0.0201 0.0157 -0.0256 -0.0260
school (-0.22) (0.34) (-0.23) (0.31) (-0.54) (-0.74)
diarrhea & 0.00634 0.00534 0.00232
fever (1.14) (0.96) (0.79)
BCG 0.0248** 0.00901 0.00612
vaccination (2.44) (1.30) (1.20)
DPT -0.0247** -0.0165** -0.00285
vaccination (-2.23) (-2.03) (-0.48)
toilet 0.0215 0.00851 0.00434
access (1.19) (0.41) (0.38)
drinking water -0.000104 0.00434 -0.00281
access (-0.03) (1.21) (-1.63)
constant 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.387*** 0.387*** 0.0771*** 0.0771***
(180.10) (175.64) (112.72) (112.37) (52.74) (52.41)
N 240 240 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.4 displays some interesting health sector results. The percentage of children receiving
the BCG vaccination and the percentage of children receiving the DPT vaccination had similar
results on subsequent health spending. A 1 percentage point increase in the BCG vaccination
rate results in a 1.2 percentage point decrease in health spending as a percent of the total
budget, ceteris paribus with significance at the 1% error level. Similar results appeared for
health clinic spending. An identical 1 percentage point increase in the BCG vaccination rate
and the DPT vaccination rate result in a .7 percentage point decrease and .8 percentage point
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decrease, respectively, in the percent of total budget spent on health clinics, all else constant.
Both are significant at the 5% level. Similar to the first iteration of the specification and
significant at the 5% level, a 1 percentage point increase in access to toilets yielded a 1.3
percentage point increase health clinic spending as a percent of the total budget, everything
else held constant.
Table 5.4: Fixed Effects Results for Health spending: condensed individual regressions
(1) (2) (3)
%health %clinic %malaria
spending spending spending
diarrhea & 0.00301 0.00158 -0.000577
fever (0.53) (0.37) (-1.33)
BCG -0.0118*** -0.00653** -0.000354
vaccination (-3.03) (-2.22) (-1.30)
DPT -0.0145*** -0.00824** -0.000366
vaccination (-3.36) (-2.42) (-1.14)
toilet -0.0100 0.0133** 0.000349
access (-0.72) (2.27) (0.65)
drinking -0.00514 -0.00134 -0.000254
water (-1.22) (-0.56) (-1.18)
N 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5.5 displays some interesting results with respect to education. A 1 percentage point
increase in the percentage of school aged children enrolled in school leads to a 1.1 percentage
point drop in the percentage of the total budget spent on education, ceteris paribus, significant
at the 10% level. Enrollment had a similar, yet smaller, effect on secondary education spend-
ing. A 1 percentage point increase in the enrollment rate results in a .8 percentage point drop
in secondary education spending as a percentage of the total budget, all else constant, and
significant at the 10% level. Also significant at the 10% error level—and counterintuitive—a
1 percentage point increase in the proportion of the population completing secondary school
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yields a 4.3 percentage point decrease in the budget share spent on secondary school, every-
thing else constant. Finally, a 1 percentage point increase in the primary school completion
rates leads to a secondary education spending decrease of 2.6 percentage points, ceteris paribus,
and significant at the 1% error level. The final result is consistent with the findings in table 5.3.
Table 5.5: Fixed Effects Results for Education spending: condensed individual regressions
(1) (2) (3)
%education %primary ed %secondary ed
spending spending spending
primary -0.0206 0.00724 -0.0263***
education (-1.45) (0.50) (-4.15)
enrollment -0.0114* 0.000308 -0.00764*
(-1.66) (0.04) (-1.96)
secondary -0.0285 0.0178 -0.0427*
education (-0.68) (0.59) (-1.69)
adult -0.00777 0.00946 -0.0149***
literacy (-0.78) (1.06) (-2.76)
N 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The first specification left us with the impression that present conditions do affect future
woreda government spending patterns to some extent, perhaps suggesting a learning process
involved with decentralization. Specifically, DPT and BCG vaccination rates consistently, and
significantly, predict both health and education spending in the future. Further, DPT and
BCG vaccination rates appear to be highly correlated, which is evident when they are both
individually regressed against health and education spending. The results also suggest that
completion of primary school significantly and negatively affects future government spending
on secondary education. While this could be due to the MDG of universal primary education,
it is also possible that the cost of primary education is rising relative to the cost of secondary
education. Finally, it is important to note that while access to toilets significantly and posi-
tively affects health clinic spending, the questions about toilet access did not receive a large
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number of responses and may be biased because of a limited sample size.
5.1.2 Does spending affect outcomes?
Recall that in equation 3.2 on page 31, we are regressing local government expenditures
and average household characteristics on future outcomes to determine whether spending by
woreda governments affects constituent outcomes. Full results are presented in tables C.1
through C.10 on pages 84 through 93, although some of the more interesting results are
described in this section. This specification is a simplified version. Some values of Xwt
are percentage changes from 2000-2004. The specification was run 12 times with the same
dependent and independent variables, each time with one of the variables in a different form1.
While the dependent variable, Mwt, was always an outcome, it took on three different forms,
the full range of which is presented in table 5.6 on page 57.
Results and theory diverge at this point. While household characteristics significantly affect
outcomes in many cases, government spending does not have as much influence. In table 5.7,
for example, a 1 percentage point increase in the size of households yields a 2.9 percentage
point increase (significant at the 1% level) and a 7 percentage point increase (significant at
the 5% level) in the likelihood that a household would obtain access to clean drinking water,
during rainy and dry seasons respecively, between 2000 and 2004, ceteris paribus. There are
also a couple of cases where, at the 10% significance level, the health budget as a percent of
total spending affects the incidence of children experiencing fever and diarrhea. Table 5.8 on
page 59 shows that 1% increase in the health budget as a percent of total spending in 2000
indicates an increase in the incidence of children experiencing fever and diarrhea of 84% in
2004, ceteris paribus.
1For example, one iteration be: %∆enrollment00−04 = %∆expenditure00−04 + %∆hhchar00−04, while the
second iteration would be: %∆enrollment00−04 = expenditure2000 + %∆hhchar00−04.
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Table 5.6: Variable descriptions for the second specification
Variable Description
Ewt Expenditure at time t (1998-2001) for woreda w
Percent change in healthcare spending
Percent change in education spending
Difference in healthcare spending
Difference in education spending
Healthcare spending, as a percent of the total budget, in 2000
Education spending, as a percent of the total budget, in 2000
Mwt & Xwt Average household characteristics
and outcomes at time t for woreda w
Percent change in enrollment
Difference in enrollment
Percent change in lavatory access
Difference in lavatory access
Percent change in water source access during rainy season
Difference in water source access during rainy season
Percent change in water source access during dry season
Difference in water source access during dry season
Percent change in BCG immunization rate
Difference in BCG immunization rate
Percent change in DPT immunization rate
Difference in DPT immunization rate
Percent change in reported illness & diarrhea
Difference in reported illness & diarrhea
Percent change in adult literacy rate
Difference in adult literacy rate
Percent change in household size
Percent change in marital status
Difference in marital status
Percent change in work status
Difference in work status
*Only a single variable in Ewt appears in each regression
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One reason government spending does not affect outcomes is that the time frame that we
examine may be too short. Both education and health results tend to take time to reveal
themselves, and 4 years may not be long enough. The answers may also lie in studies already
conducted. Collier et al. (2001) suggests that Ethiopians care a great deal about both quality
and quantity of healthcare, but that the government is building large numbers of health clinics,
often at the expense of the quality of healthcare, so increased expenditures may be negated
by inattention to quality. Additionally, since 1994, the government has been shifting money
toward administration costs and post-secondary education at the expense of other education
expenditures, such as primary education. In fiscal year 2000-2001, Amhara’s budget share for
education spending was just 83% of what it was in 1994, in real terms (Nakhavanit, 2005).
Statistically, there are a couple reasons why the results may be insignificant. The first is a
problem of small variance: when aggregated to the woreda level, some variables don’t vary
much. The second possibility is a sample size that is too small to yield anything significant.
Indeed, only 18 of the 60 woredas in the sample had answers to the questions about toilet
access. This could also lead to biased results when considering the outcomes regarding toilet
access.
Of course, another reason that woreda level spending is not affecting outcomes may be due
to the institutions in place. Indeed, recalling the recent increased control on power by the
central government, the fiscal decentralization practiced by the government may simply not
be effective in the health and education sectors. This could indicate that health and education
are either not very decentralized and under control of the regional government. Additionally,
participation in local government is a condition for successful fiscal decentralization, and
voter intimidation does not give constituents much incentive to participate. Alternatively,
entrenched tribalism may also be a reason for less effective fiscal decentralization. If local
elites target education and health spending as the safest sectors from which to take money,
spending will be less effective.
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Many opportunities remain for further experiments. Ideally, we would have expenditure per
capita measures with which to measure spending trends. In addition, expenditure and behav-
ior data that spans both pre- and post-decentralization would be instrumental in obtaining
an idea of how quickly fiscal decentralization is effective. Including data from other regions of
Ethiopia could help fix the small variation problem, as well as bolster the model with a more
representative cross-section of the country. Future studies could include some of Ethiopia’s
neighbors in a cross country study, or independent examinations of the fiscal decentralization
attempts in other Sub-Saharan African countries.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Ethiopia has undergone tumultuous changes in the past 15 years. Using the Leninist Russian
model of ethnic federalism, it wrote decentralization into its constitution and struggled to
implement these changes in the context of 2000 prior years of imperial rule and one of the
most ethnically diverse countries to undertake decentralization to date. And while recent
events by the ruling party have undermined its attempt to strengthen the practice of ethnic
federalism, Ethiopia’s institutional structure is more amenable than it was when it undertook
the process in 1991.
Using the foundational work of Wallace Oates, this study began by examining the theoret-
ical effects of fiscal decentralization on local public goods provision. The theory suggested
that fiscal decentralization, undertaken with proper institutions in place, increases efficiency
through increased information, closer proximity, and greater accountability to constituents.
This increased efficiency indicates that local governments are more likely to allocate resources
toward the needs of constituents. The theory also implies that because local governments are
more informed during the budget process, changes in spending have a greater, and quicker,
effect on local outcomes than would spending by the central government.
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Adapting Faguet’s model of government sensitivity to local public good provision under de-
centralization to the Amhara region of Ethiopia, we built an econometric specification to
measure effectiveness of local government spending over time. We also created a specification
with which to measure whether or not that local spending led to different behavior among
the constituency. We expected education spending, as a percent of the total budget, to be
positively affected by increased primary and secondary school completion rates, and similarly
by increased enrollment and literacy rates. Presuming increased BCG and DPT vaccination
rates would lead to increased health spending, as a percent of the total budget, we also ex-
pected a similar positive effect from the literacy rate. In addition, we anticipated an increased
incidence of diarrhea and fever among children under the age of 5 would positively affect
health spending. These expectations set the stage for application of the theory to our data
to see if fiscal decentralization has had an effect on local government spending patterns and
local constituent behavior.
Data containing household surveys and woreda expenditures in the Amhara region of Ethiopia
were used to test this theory. These tests studied how changes in local government spend-
ing affect outcomes and, somewhat tangentially, how local conditions affect future spending
patterns. Using a fixed effects ordinary least squares model, this study found that DPT and
BCG immunization rates—highly correlated—negatively affected both health and education
spending in the future. This result could indicate that woreda level governments are listening
to their constituency and increasing spending in response to a local demand for immuniza-
tions. When examined in context with the institutions in place, however, the most likely
explanation is that these results reflect the level of public good provision that would have
occurred regardless of voter preference—perhaps reflecting donor preference.
Using a standard ordinary least squares model to examine how changes in spending affect
local outcomes gave inconclusive results. One reason for this may be the result of a time
frame that was too short to observe any noticeable changes in outcomes for either of theses
sectors. Another possible explanation is that the health and education sectors are not very
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decentralized, or the decentralization in place is not effectively practiced. Yet another, and
much more likely explanation, is that local spending is trivial compared to regional and
national spending on healthcare and education. Additional studies may also include other
sectors of public goods provision, such as infrastructure and public transportation.
Perhaps the most interesting result of this study is that, on balance, fiscal decentralization
did not seem to have much of an effect on local outcomes or spending patterns. This is
particularly surprising when examined in context with how widely fiscal decentralization is
prescribed in the developing world. Ethiopia’s aggregate local spending patterns did not
change substantially, and when they did, were not influential in changing outcomes. Using
raw spending changes instead of changes in budget share per sector could improve results in
future studies. However, Ethiopia’s decentralization is fairly young, its institutions are still
developing, and the effects of fiscal decentralization display substantial lag time. It is likely
that many of the results observed were influenced more heavily by institutional factors than by
the changes in government spending. Support for this view can be seen in the 2005 elections
where voter intimidation and opposition oppression was rampant.
There are many implications of fiscal decentralization theory, only a few of which were explored
in this thesis. While this study used expenditures for testing purposes, the assignment of
expenditure decisions in the context of fiscal decentralization was only briefly touched upon
in the review of the literature. Future studies could include an examination of just where
governments draw the lines between local, regional, and national provision of goods. As fiscal
decentralization becomes a more prevalent policy tool, this too is likely to become a more
important topic.
Appendix A
The Survey
A.1 Questionnaire
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CENTRAL STATISTICAL AUTHORITY 
WELFARE MONITORING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 2004 FORM 1
                 FORM 1 :  ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERSTICS
SECTION 1 : AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2   Region  3 Zone 4 Wereda 5 Town 6 Kefele Ketema /k/              7 Kebele/FA                                   8  EA code        9 H/H Ser.No         10 Household Size 12 Head of househo
Job ID     Holding
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes=1 22
W 0 2 No  =2
SECTION 2 : ECONOMIC  AND  DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERSTICS (All household members)
13 14 15 16 17 18 20 21 22 23
From column 18 - 23 ask members aged 10 years and above
For All Household Members Marital If code 2 in          If code 1 in Column 19 or Column 20
status was ----- column 20
engaged in Reason for        Employment Status Sector of 
Relation to head of productive not working Employer =01 Employment
List of household household Sex work during Self employed 
members the last Absent   (formal) =02 What was main activity 
(Listing Order) 7 days ? from work               =Self  Employed your main  of the organization
Head Head =00 Never  unemployed           (informal) =03 occupation you mainly work for
spouse Spouse =01 married       =1 (active)                    =Employed, Private during the
childern not married Son /daughter of Currently Yes=1 Unemployed   (formal) =04 Last 7 days ?  
children married head and spouse =02 married       =2 (inactive)                =Employed, private
Ser. Other relatives Son/daughter of head =03 Divorsed     =3          skip to Student                   =  (informal ) =05
 No Domestic servant Son/daughter of spouse =04 Separated   =4          column 21 Domestic Employed, public enterprise =06
Employed guard Father/mother of head/ Widowed     =5 service                    =Employed, other   (Refer to   industrial
Non relatives spouse =05 Pensioner               =   public organization =07     classification code)
Brother/Sister of head / No =2 Old age                   =Empolyed, by NGO =08
spouse =06 Illness                        =Employed    
Other relatives =07 Others                     =  by household =09
Employed domestic Serva=08 Unpaid family worker          =10
Employed Guard =09 Others                                   =11
Non -relative =10
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
0 1
0 2
0 3
0 4
0 5
0 6
0 7
0 8
0 9
1 0
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
    11 Agri.
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WELFARE MONITORING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 2004
FORM 2 : EDUCATION
FORM 2
SECTION 1 : AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2   Region  3 Zone 4 Wereda 5 Town 6 Kefele Ketema /k/w 7 Kebele/FA                          8 EA code 9 Household se10 Household Size               12 Head of household
Job ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ## 11 13 14 15 ## ## 20 21 Yes= 22
W 0 2 No=2
SECTION 2 : EDUCATIONAL STATUS (For all household members aged five years and over)
## 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Can (NAMEDoes (NAMEHas (NAM What is What is the If code 1 in column 20 If registeredIf registeredIf (NAME) If code 2 in column 26
read and have capac ever  the Main  highest Has (NAMEIf currently What type of  What is the  Has (NAME) last year Did NAME   took Reason for not  
write ? to perform attended reason for  grade currently registered school is it ? main problem registered towhich took final examcompleting ?
simple school? not attendincompleted ?registered twhich of the school attend schoograde ? final exam last year
arithmetic ?(Formal School ? attend grade ? Governmental   =1 you are attending ?  last year ? last year? did he/she 
List  of household  (+,-,x, ÷) education (Select from school ? Private religious If any ? (formal pass the Need to work  =01
members aged 5 the   fee payable   =2 education)    Refer to  exam ? Too expensive Sch. fee  =02
years & over choices    (Refer to    Refer to  Private religious Yes=1 education Lack of
(transfer below) education education   without fee   =3 No  =2 Yes =1    code educational materials  =03
Serial from    code)    code Private  non- No  =2 School Too far  =04
No form 1)  Religious organ.   =4 Yes = 1 Yes = 1 Deteriorated quality  =05
Community - run   =5 No   = 2 No   = 2 Failed in exam  =06
(transfer Yes=1 Yes=1 Yes=1 Others   =6 Married (formally)  =07
from No  =2 No  =2 No  =2 Married (forced)  =08
Form 1) Sickness =09
Pregnancy/ maternity le =10
Natural calamities  =11
Human caused calamitie =12
Belief to have acquired 
enough education =13
Reception of lack of job 
after school =14
Others  =15
## 24 25 26 27 ## 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 ## ## ## 39 ## ## 42 43 44 45 46 47 ## 49
Need to Work           -01  Marriage                                               -05 Under School age               -09
Family not willing     -02  illness                                                     -06  To old to go to School       -10
Too Expensive          -03 Disabled                                                 -07 Other                                  -11
No school arround    -04 Do not know the value of education    -08
11 Agr.Holding
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   WELFARE MONITORING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE - 2004
FORM 3 : HEALTH  FORM 3
SECTION 1 : AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2   Region  3 Zone 4  Wereda 5 Town 6 Kefele Ketema /k/w 7 Kebele/FA                   8 EA code 9 House Hold ser. No 10 House Hold Size 11 Agr. Holding 12 Head of household
Job ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes=1 22
W 0 2 No  =2
SECTION 2: HEALTH (For all household members)
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
        If code 1 incloumn 15         If code 1 incloumn 18 If code 1 in column 20  If code 2 in column 18     For women aged For household members aged 
 Has (NAME) If consulted for Have you realized/ How many        15 years and Over           below 18 years
Has  (NAME) What sort of For how many consulted medical assistance faced any What was the problem encounteredWhy didn't you times has If code 1 in 
List  of faced any sickness/injury ? days were you any  mainly from where ? problem in the health institution visited? consult health  (NAME) Column 24 Yes  =1
household health absent from health with Yes = 1 institutions/ consulted Has (NAME) Has (NAME) No  =2
Ser.  members problem Malaria   =1 your usual instituion Traditional healer     =the health N0 = 2 traditional healer for Medical been received Don't 
 No during  the Diarrhea         =2 activity due to or traditional Hospital(gov't)          =Institution visited? during the last assistance pregnant  Pre-natal  know  =3
last 2  Injury   =3 your health healer Health center (gov't)=Yes=1 two months ? during  the over the  care during
(transfer months? Dental   =4  problem during  the Health clinic(gov't)   =No  =2 No need to consu =1 last 12  last 12 the last 12
from Opthalmic   =5 during  the last 2  Health post (gov't)    =4 Financial months? months ? months ?
Form 1) Yes=1 Skin disease  =6 last 2  months? Private health instit. =Skip to  incapability  =2
No  =2 ENT   =7 months? Mission (NGO)          =Column 23 Expensive service =3
Tuberclousis  =8 Private health Service too far  =4 Yes = 1 Yes = 1
Others            =9 personnel                  =7 Inconfident with No = 2 No = 2
Go to col. 18 Yes=1 Pharmacy                  =8 the quality level
No  =2 Others                        =9  of the institution  =5
Do not belive in 
Skip to  medical treatment 
Column 22  at all  =6
Lack of qualified 
health personnel =7
Poor service/
equipment =8
Others =9
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
0 1
0 2
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0 4
0 5
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0 7
0 8
0 9
1 0
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Section 3 :- For Households with Orphan children Section 4:-For ask Household having Members that were  Sick  for at least 3 consecuetive months
30 31 32 33 34 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
                      Orphan children under 18 years of Age Household members who were Sick for at least 3 consecuetive months over the last 12 months
(If code 2 in  section2 Column 26 or column  28) If 'Yes' in Column 35
            If Yes in Column 32 Has any member of  List of  Household members 
         List of  Orphan Children Is there any free  What type of      What was the source the Household  who were Sick If 'Yes' in Column 40
support given to  free Support was      of the free support? been sick for  for at least 3 consecutive months Did the household  What type of
the Household given to the household? at least 3 received free  free Support was What was the source
to help the Orphans consecuetive months? support on accoungiven to the Householdof the free support?
over the last Yes  =1 Yes  =1 of the sick memberto help the member?
12 Months? No  =2 No  =2 Yes  =1
 Full Name Sex Age No  =2
Full Name  (Exclude Injury) Yes  =1
 No  =2
(Ask for each of the Yes    =1
Childrens) No     =2
Yes  =1
No  =2
(Transfer (Transfer Yes  =1
from from No  =2 (Question ends)
Form 3 Form 3 (Question ends)
Section 2 Section 2                    Skip to Col 35
Column 13) Column 14)
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WELFARE MONITORING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 2004
FORM 4
FORM 4 : ANTHROPOMETRY, IMMUNIZATION AND CHILD CARE (Under 5 Children)
SECTION 1 : AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6 Kefele Ketema 7 8 9  10  11 12
Job ID Region Zone Woreda Town  Keftegna/ Wereda Kebele FA EA Code Household Ser. No Household size Agri.  HoldingHead of household
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes = 1 22
W 0 2 No = 2
SECTION 2 : ANTHROPOMETRY, IMMUNIZATION AND CHILD CARE (Children aged 00 - 59 months )
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 # 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
From column 17 - 28 ask For children aged  00 - 59 months For children  
Where was Who assisted  Is the child immunized against --------- ? Was the  If the  aged 3-59 
Ser. List of all Serial  How old the child  during Do you How many Does the child child was months
No of children No of is the born ? delivery ? have the times has thechild sick of sick of 
child under 5 years natural child Child Measles    BCG   DPT Polio child  ever participate diarrhea, diarrhea,  Weight   Height 
of age mother? (in months) immunization  taken in diet / fever or how did you   (in gram )   (in c.m.)
Hospital  =1 Medical personne =1 Card with Vit. A dozes?weigh-ins cough assist the child? 
(Transfer (Transfer from (Transfer Clinic  =2 Delivery nurse  =2 you ? program? during  
 from Form 1 section 2  from Health cente =3 Trained TBA  =3 Yes     =1 Yes  =1   Yes  =1   Yes  =1 Yes  =1 the last 
Form 1)  column 13)  Form 1) Health post  =4 TBA (Not Trained =4 Lost   =2 No  =2   No  =2   No  =2 No  =2 2 weeks ?Given clinical ORS =1
At home  =5 Self assisted  =5 Kept with the    Yes  =1 Given home-made ORS =2
If the Other  =6 Other  =6 Health     Yes  =1    No  =2 Given  Other fluids =3
mother is Don't know  =7 Don't know  =7 Institiution     =3    No  =2 consulted modern
not member No Card  health institution =4
of  the HH, at all     =4 Treated traditionally =5
enter 00 Not assisted =6
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 # 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
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WELFARE  MONITORING  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  2004
FORM 5 : HOUSING AMENITIES  FORM 5
SECTION 1 : AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5   6 KIfle Ketema/ 7 8 9  10  11 12
Job ID Region Zone Woreda Town     Keftegna/ Wereda Kebele FA   EA Code Household  Ser. N Household size Agri.  Holding  Head of household
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes = 1 22
W 0 2 No = 2
 
SECTION 2 : HOUSING AMENITIES
13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Does this How long On what basis does the Main construction Main construction What is the main Was there any What is the main source
Ser. household existhas this household occupy the dwelling unit? material of material of the source of  electric power of cooking fuel  ?
 No 12 months ago?household the wall ? roof ? light? interrupt (Lasting for  
been living owned  = 0 How many rooms more than an hour)
Yes  = 1 in this From employer does the dwelling during the past week ?
No  = 2 dwelling (Free of charge or subsidized)  = 1 unit has ? Wood & mud  =1 Corrugated iron shee  =1 Mainly collected fire wood  =1
unit? From relative Wood & Grass  =2 Thatch & Grass  =2 Kerosine  = 1 Do not use electric power  = 1 Mainly purchased fire wood = 2
(Free of charge or subsidized) = 2 (Excluding kitchen Reed & Bamboo  =3 Wood & Mud  =3 Electricity(Private) = 2 No interruption  = 2 Charcoal  = 3
Rented from employer  = 3 and toilets) Mud & Stone  =4 Reed & bamboo  =4 Electricity(shared) = 3 Only once  = 3 Kerosene  = 4
Rented from Gov't Rent Agency  = 4 Cement & Stones  =5 Clay  =5 Firewood  = 4 Twice  = 4 Butane gas  = 5
Rented from Kebele = 5 Hollow Blocks  =6 Others  =6 Candle  = 5 Three or more times  = 5 Electricity  = 6
Rented from other NGO'S  = 6 Bricks  =7 Others (specify) =6 Crop residue  = 7
Rented from Relatives  = 7 Others  =8 Don't use cooking fuel  = 8
Rented from non-relative househol = 8 Other /specify/  = 9
Others  = 9
 Year   Month
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37
0 1 Now Now Now Now Now Now
0 2 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 
0 3 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago
SECTION 2 : HOUSING AMENITIES (Cont' d)
23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Ser. What is he main source of drinkingWhat is the main source of  Does the Household Does the household What type of toilet facility What type of waste disposal 
No water in rainy season? drinking water in dry season ? have a habit of boiling use Iodated salt ? does the household use ? facility does the household use ? 
water before drinking ?
(Test the salt) Flush toilet (private )  = 1 Use waste disposal vehicle/   = 1
Tap inside the house =1 Tap inside the house = 1 Yes  = 1 Flush toilet (shared)  = 2 Use container  = 2
Tap in compoud  (private) = 2 Tap in compoud  (private) = 2 No  = 2 Pit latrine (private )  = 3 Uses dug-outs  = 3
Tap in compound (shared) = 3 Tap in compound (shared) = 3 Yes  =1 Pit latrine (shared)  = 4 Throw away  = 4
Tap water outside the compound (shared = 4 Tap water outside the compound (shared) = 4 No  =2 Container (household utensils)  = 5 Use as fertilizer  = 5
Protected well/Spring = 5 Protected well/Spring = 5 Field /forest  = 6 Burning the waste  = 6
unprotected well/Spring = 6 unprotected well/Spring = 6 Others( specify)  = 7 Others( specify)  =7
Rain water =7 River, lake, pond ... etc =7
River, lake, pond ... etc =8
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
0 1 Now Now Now Now Now Now
0 2 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 
0 3 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago
14
WELFARE MONITORING SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE - 2004
FORM 6 : BASIC FACILITIES ACCESS , UTILIZATION AND SATISFACTION  FORM 6
SECTION 1 : AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6 KIfle Ketema/ 7 8 9  10  11 12
Job ID Region Zone Woreda Town   Keftegna/ Wereda Kebele FA EA Code Household  Ser. NoHousehold size Agri.  Holding  Head of household
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes = 1 22
W 0 2 No = 2
SECTION 2 : ACCESS  AND UTILIZATION OF BASIC FACILITIES
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
If code 1 or 2 If the household utilizes the service
To what extent in column 16   (if  code 2, 3 and 4 in column 16)
How far is the nearest does  Main reason for non-use orAre you satisfiedHow does the quality of the  serviceWhat   mode  of  transport does  
facility ? the household use this occasional use of the faciliwith the service?compare with that of 12 months agothe household  mostly use to
facility ? Ask for each reach the nearest facility ?  
Type of facility Yes= 1 On foot =1
 (if the distance is less than a k.mDo not use at all = 1 No = 2 Bicycle =2
Serial            enter ' 00' ) Use occasionally = 2 Yes = 1 Worse now  =1 Motor cycle =3
No Use often = 3 No = 2 Same  =2 Private car =4
Use always = 4 Don't know = 3 Better now  =3 Public transport =5
Don't know  =4 Office Transport =6
Animal transport =7
Others/ specify =8
To
o 
fa
r a
w
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t
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O
th
er
 Kilo Meter  Hours  Minutes
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
0 1 Primary school
0 2 Secondary school
0 3 Health post
0 4 Clinic
0 5 Health center
0 6 Hospital
0 7  prenatal/postnatal care
0 8 Telecommunication
0 9 postal service
1 0 Public transport
1 1 Milling  service
1 2 Drinking water (dry season)
1 3 Drinking water (rainy season)
1 4 Food market
1 5 All weather road 
1 6 Dry weather road 
1 7 Agricultural extension service
1 8 Veternary service
1 9 Fertilizer provider
2 0 Improved seeds provider
2 1 Pesticides/Herbicides/Insecticides provider
2 2 Police station
2 3 Primary court
2 4 Micro finance
2 5 Source of fire wood
WELFARE  MONITORING  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  2004 FORM 7
FORM 7:  ASSET OWNERSHIP
SECTION 1 :  AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2 3 4 Kefetegna 7 8  EA Househo 10 Househol     Agri.
            Job ID          Region                Zone            Woreda Town Wereda ( K/ Ketema)          Kebele  FA Code                    Sr. N o Size              holding Head of household
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes = 1 22
W 0 2 No  = 2
SECTION 2:  OWNERSHIP OF LAND, DWELLINGS AND OTHER BUILDINGS
13 14 15 16 # 21
Does this Does any member  How many Does any member      If code 1 in column 17
household of the household dwellings or othe of the household How many     How does the
exist  12 (including the buildings (including the head plots / piece size of land /
months ago?head of the are owned of the household) of land does plots compare 
household) own in all ? own any land the household to the amount 
dwellings or other holding ? own ? 12 months ago/
buildings ? 5 years ago?
Yes        = 1
Yes     = 1 Yes        = 1 No         = 2 Total area of the land Less now      =1
No       = 2 No         = 2 Same now    =2
More now    = 3
Don't  know = 4
   skip to 
         column 17
                 In local unit            In standard unit
Name Code   Area Name Code Area
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
0 1 Now Now Now Now Now Now
0 2 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 12 months ago 
0 3 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago 5 years ago 
SECTION 2:  OWNERSHIP OF LAND, DWELLINGS AND OTHER BUILDINGS (Cont'd)
23 24 25
                If code 2, 3, and 4 in column 22
How does the How many How does the size of  
household  plots / piece land/plots  that
use  land  it of land that is not is not owned by
does not does the househol the  household 
own ? owned use that compare with
it doesn't the amount  Total area of the land
own ? 12 months ago ?
Do not use             = 1
Rented                   = 2 Less now              = 1
Share cropped      = 3 Same now            = 2
Rent free               = 4 More now             = 3
Others                    = 5 Don' t  know         = 4
             In local unit               In standard unit
Name Code  Area Name Code Area
47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
Now Now Now Now
12 months ago 12 months ago
5 years ago 5 years ago 
129 11
22
20
26
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FORM 7
FORM 7:  ASSET OWNERSHIP
SECTION 3: OWNERSHIP OF OTHER HOUSEHOLD ASSET
27 28 29 30 31
   If yes in column 29 How does the amount currently 
Does the household owned compare with
Household assets currently own _____ ? How many does 12 months ago ? 
the household 
Yes                = 1 own ? More now  =1
No                  = 2 Same now  =2
Less now  =3
Go to col.31 Not applicable = 4
Not applicable  =3
65 66 67 68 69 70 71
0 1 Cattle 
0 2 Ploughing animals
0 3 Pack-animals
0 4 Equine animals
0 5 Sheep and goats
0 6 Poultry/chicken
0 7  'Mofer & Kember'
0 8 Sickle/ 'Mecha'
0 9 Axe/ 'Gejera'
1 0 Pick axe/ 'Geso'
1 1 Plough
1 2 Stoves /Gas,electric/
1 3 Blanket/''Gabi''
1 4 Mattersses and/or  beds
1 5 Watches or clocks
1 6 Iron (electric or charcol)
1 7 Telephone(Landline/Mobile/
1 8 Radio
1 9 Television
2 0 Video deck
2 1 Sofa set
2 2 Table and chair
2 3 Bicycle
2 4 Cart 
2 5 Sewing machine
2 6 Loom 
2 7 Refrigrator
2 8 Car (Private or commercial ) 
2 9 Jewellery (Gold/Silver)
Se
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WELFARE  MONITORING  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  2004
FORM 8:  SELECTED INDICATORS OF HOUSEHOLDS  LIVING CONDITIONS FORM 8
SECTION 1 :  AREA IDENTIFICATION
2 4 5 6 7 8 EA 9 Household 10 Househol
Job ID Region Zone Woreda Town Kefetegna Kebele  FA Code Sr. No Size   holding Head of household
1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 # 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes = 1 22
W 2 No  = 2
SECTION 2: INDICATORS OF HOUSEHOLDS  LIVING CONDITIONS
13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 23
Has this    If Yes  in How is this How is this How is How is For how many Is the househol If "yes" in column 21 What is the 
householdColumn 14 household's household's the overall the overall months do you capable to raise main source How many 
suffered For how mancurrent living current living living  living think your 100 Birr within How would the of income times does  
food months  standard with standard with standared of  standared of current year croaweek time household obtain  of the        Major Shocks    If code 1 in this househo
shortage has this respect to respect to the householdthe communitproduction lastsincase of any the 100 Birr? household ?    column 24 experienced
during household  food compareclothing compare with compare with in subsisting theemergency   During the last 12 monthsHow did the
the last suffered with 12 monthcompare with 12 months  12 months household ?  emergency Sale of animals/produc =01 (In cash the householdMajor Shock
12 food shortagago ? 12 months ago? ago ? need? Sale of crops  =02     or in kind) cope with the over the
months? during the last ago ? Sale of  forest  product =03 shock ? last 5 years?
# months? Own cash  =04 Yes = 1 Yes = 1
Withdrawal from  =05 No = 2 No = 2 (Ask for each
Yes=1 (If less than Much worse n =1 Much wors  =1 Much wor     =1 Much wors       =1 Yes       = Bank/Saving of the 
No=2 one month Worse now  =2 Worse now  =2 Worse now     =2 Worse now        =2 No        =Equb'  =06 Specified 
enter 00) Same   =3 Same   =3 Same      =3 Same        =3 Edir'  =07 Major Shock
A little better  A little better A little better A little better Loan from Bank or In Col. 24)
now   =4 now    =4 now     =4 now        =4 other institutions  =08
Much better  Much better  Much better  Much better  Loan from Relatives  =09
now   =5 now   =5 now     =5         now        =5 Gift from Relatives =10
Don't Loan from non-relatives=11
        know        =6 Gift from non-relatives=12
Sale of household 
assets =13
Sale of personal items
   (Jewelleries , etc.) 14 Death of household member
Others (specify) 15 illness of huosehold member
Loss of job of household member
Food shortage
Draught
Flood
Crop damage
Loss / death of livestock
Price shock 
Other (Specify)
23 25 26 27 # 29 # 31 32 33 34 # 34 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
0
Codes for column 23 :
From own agricultural enterprise        =01 Collected free (wood,Water, ...etc) =07 Income from house rent  =13
From household enterprise other than agriculture        =02 Wages salaries,bounes,overtime and allowances =08 Income from rent other 
Gift and remittance received from gov. organization        =03 Pension and other social security benefits =09 than house rent  =14
Gift and remittance received from NGOs        =04 From saving (Bank and other, saving account)  =10 From Sale of household fixed
Gift and remittance received from households/individuals       =05 Interests and royalties received  =11 assets and personal care goods  =15
Gift and remittance received from abroad      =06 Dividends =12 Other current transfers =16
16
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WELFARE  MONITORING  SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  2004 Form-9
FORM 9:  HIV/ AIDS  RELATED INDICATORS
SECTION 1 :  AREA IDENTIFICATION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8.EA 9 Household 10 Household 11 Agri.
Job ID Region Zone Woreda Town Kefetegna Kebele  FA Code Sr. No Size  holding Head of household
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 Yes = 1 22
W 0 2 No  = 2
13 15 16 18
DO You know  the If Yes in COL.14 Did you realize any person If 'yes' in Column 16 Which HIV/AIDS If yes If code1 (Yes ) in Col 19
 existence of HIV/AIDS? Do you know (sick / dead) of HIV/AIDS Would you please  Protection Methods in Column 18 To what extent  
Yes=1   HIV/AIDS in your village during specify the number of persons whom do you know ? Have you ever used did you use the  
No=2 Transmisson ways? the last twelve months? you think were Sick /Dead of HIV/AIDS in your Village  any of the protection protection methods ?
 Yes  =1 Yes                         =1 during the last 12 Months? methods in the last Always                     =1
(End Questions) No    =2 No                           =2 Yes                               =1 twelve months ? Most of the time     =2
 I don’t Know          =3 No                                =2 Some times              =3
Not willing to answer  =4 Not willing to Answer =3
Yes                        =1
No                         =2
Not willing to Answer=3 (Please ask
for each of the 
method stated below)
Being Using
Sick         Dead Faithfull Absteinance Condom
Age
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
0 1 Below age 15 Being Faithfull
0 2 15-64 Absteinance
0 3 65 and above Condom
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SECTION 2:   HIV/AIDS  (ALL HOUSEHOLDS)
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Regression Tables for Specification
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APPENDIX B. REGRESSION TABLES FOR SPECIFICATION 1 78
Table B.1: Fixed Effects Results for Health and Education spending: condensed individual
regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
% Health % Clinic % Malaria % Education % Primary Educ % Secondary Educ
spending spending spending spending spending spending
primary -0.0143 0.00978 0.00172** -0.0206 0.00724 -0.0263***
school (-0.89) (0.89) (2.20) (-1.45) (0.50) (-4.15)
enrollment -0.00585 0.00481 0.000517 -0.0114* 0.000308 -0.00764*
rate (-0.71) (0.82) (1.65) (-1.66) (0.04) (-1.96)
secondary -0.0355 0.0276 0.00136 -0.0285 0.0178 -0.0427*
school (-0.68) (1.05) (0.73) (-0.68) (0.59) (-1.69)
diarrhea & 0.00301 0.00158 -0.000577 0.00696 0.00479 0.00351
fever (0.53) (0.37) (-1.33) (1.39) (0.88) (1.08)
BCG -0.0118*** -0.00653** -0.000354 0.00123 -0.000990 0.000394
vaccination (-3.03) (-2.22) (-1.30) (0.34) (-0.26) (0.17)
DPT -0.0145*** -0.00824** -0.000366 -0.00174 -0.00265 -0.000100
vaccination (-3.36) (-2.42) (-1.14) (-0.43) (-0.61) (-0.04)
literacy -0.0182 0.00423 0.000574 -0.00777 0.00946 -0.0149***
rate (-1.53) (0.53) (0.95) (-0.78) (1.06) (-2.76)
toilet -0.0100 0.0133** 0.000349 -0.00211 0.00523 -0.00869
access (-0.72) (2.27) (0.65) (-0.20) (0.74) (-1.20)
drinking water -0.00514 -0.00134 -0.000254 0.0000293 0.00331 -0.00170
access (-1.22) (-0.56) (-1.18) (0.01) (1.04) (-0.94)
N 240 240 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.2: Fixed Effects Results for Health spending: individual regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Health % Health % Health % Health % Health
spending spending spending spending spending
time 0.000788 0.00525*** 0.00598*** 0.00207* 0.00351**
(0.40) (2.98) (3.21) (1.70) (2.27)
diarrhea & 0.00301
fever (0.53)
BCG -0.0118***
vaccination (-3.03)
DPT -0.0145***
vaccination (-3.36)
toilet -0.0100
access (-0.72)
drinking water -0.00514
access (-1.22)
constant 0.0955*** 0.0955*** 0.0955*** 0.0955*** 0.0955***
(26.90) (27.86) (28.04) (27.02) (27.26)
N 240 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.3: Fixed Effects Results for Health Clinic spending: individual regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Clinic % Clinic % Clinic % Clinic % Clinic
spending spending spending spending spending
time 0.00199 0.00443*** 0.00489*** 0.00189** 0.00293**
(1.44) (3.38) (3.50) (2.26) (2.18)
diarrhea & 0.00158
fever (0.37)
BCG -0.00653**
vaccination (-2.22)
DPT -0.00824**
vaccination (-2.42)
toilet 0.0133**
access (2.27)
drinking water -0.00134
access (-0.56)
constant 0.0569*** 0.0569*** 0.0569*** 0.0569*** 0.0569***
(24.25) (24.97) (25.08) (24.35) (24.28)
N 240 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.4: Fixed Effects Results for Malaria spending: individual regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Malaria % Malaria % Malaria % Malaria % Malaria
spending spending spending spending spending
time -0.0000188 -0.0000777 -0.0000768 -0.000200** -0.0000940
(-0.16) (-0.81) (-0.78) (-2.19) (-0.86)
diarrhea & -0.000577
fever (-1.33)
BCG -0.000354
vaccination (-1.30)
DPT -0.000366
vaccination (-1.14)
toilet 0.000349
access (0.65)
drinking water -0.000254
access (-1.18)
constant 0.00196*** 0.00196*** 0.00196*** 0.00196*** 0.00196***
(8.76) (8.72) (8.71) (8.67) (8.70)
N 240 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.5: Fixed Effects Results for Education spending: individual regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Education % Education % Education % Education
spending spending spending spending
time -0.00267 -0.00279* -0.00397*** -0.00308
(-1.61) (-1.94) (-3.37) (-1.57)
primary -0.0206
school (-1.45)
enrollment -0.0114*
rate (-1.66)
secondary -0.0285
school (-0.68)
literacy -0.00777
rate (-0.78)
constant 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.523*** 0.523***
(174.83) (174.75) (172.25) (172.94)
N 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.6: Fixed Effects Results for Primary Education spending: individual regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Primary Education % Primary Education % Primary Education % Primary Education
spending spending spending spending
time -0.00375** -0.00319** -0.00340*** -0.00472**
(-2.21) (-2.08) (-2.66) (-2.54)
primary 0.00724
school (0.50)
enrollment 0.000308
rate (0.04)
secondary 0.0178
school (0.59)
literacy 0.00946
rate (1.06)
constant 0.387*** 0.387*** 0.387*** 0.387***
(112.44) (112.46) (112.60) (112.69)
N 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.7: Fixed Effects Results for Secondary Education spending: individual regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Secondary Education % Secondary Education % Secondary Education % Secondary Education
spending spending spending spending
time 0.00410*** 0.00299*** 0.00253*** 0.00440***
(5.42) (3.91) (3.93) (4.53)
primary -0.0263***
school (-4.15)
enrollment -0.00764*
rate (-1.96)
secondary -0.0427*
school (-1.69)
literacy -0.0149***
rate (-2.76)
constant 0.0771*** 0.0771*** 0.0771*** 0.0771***
(52.56) (50.56) (50.43) (51.54)
N 240 240 240 240
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Appendix C
Regression Tables for Specification
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